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BRINGING RELEVANCE BACK TO 
CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY  
Nathalie Martin* 
This Paper was presented at the Seventeenth Annual Emory Bankruptcy 
Developments Journal Symposium in February of 2020. Less than a month later, 
all or most travel had ceased and many of us began the process of social 
distancing and restructuring our lives in the face of the coronavirus. No one 
could have predicted this event and its effects on the world are both profound 
and unknown. The virus has uncovered or at least highlighted vast inequalities 
in our entire economic system, including consumer credit systems. While some 
of us lament not being able to see our friends or teach live classes, others wonder 
when they will see their next paycheck, how they will pay the rent, or feed their 
families. 
In light of these events, consumer bankruptcy seems not just irrelevant, but 
as some on the panel have suggested, downright ill-equipped to deal with the 
critical underlying issues, namely vast systemic economic and other inequalities. 
Consumer bankruptcy is at best a Band-Aid loosely adhering to the surface of a 
far larger problem. Having said that, the consumer bankruptcy system is still a 
pretty good short-term fix for a myriad of financial problems, large and small, 
but is a short-term solution at best. Thus, I admit upfront that when I proclaim 
consumer bankruptcy’s irrelevance, I simply mean that the system could do a 
far greater job meeting the modern consumer’s fundamental financial needs. 
Below I try to identify those needs, but none solve the real problems which are 
far larger than bankruptcy law can address.  
In many ways and for many reasons, consumer bankruptcy has become 
virtually irrelevant. Like estranged lovers, consumers and bankruptcy have 
moved apart in the forty years since the 1978 Code was enacted. The Bankruptcy 
Code (Code) has changed drastically, through a series of amendments, but 
particularly the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 
2005 amendments (2005 Amendments). While much has been written about the 
game-changing 2005 overhaul in the law, those changes are dwarfed by the 
 
 * Frederick M. Hart Chair, University of New Mexico School of Law. The author thanks Stewart Paley, 
Clair Gardner, Marlene Valdez, Ernesto Longa, the editors of the Emory Bankruptcy Developments Law Journal, 
as well as my commenters, Pamela Foohey, Dan Keating, and David Lander. I am also grateful for the wonderful 
symposium event and the entire Bankruptcy Developments Journal staff. Special thanks go to Connor Edwards 
who created a spectacular event right before the coronavirus or COVID-19 hit in earnest.  
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radical ways in which consumers’ financial lives have changed over the same 
forty years.  
To start, the wealth and income gaps between rich and poor are the largest 
today in history. Since bankruptcy’s primary consumer users are middle class,1 
a shrinking middle class means smaller percentages of bankruptcy filers. 
America is also more diverse than it was forty years ago. A higher percentage of 
Americans are people of color but the wealth and income gaps between people 
of color and other Americans are also at all-time highs.2 In short, wages and 
wealth are down for many if not most Americans, but even more so for 
Americans of color.  
While wages and wealth are down, credit and debt are way up.3 Americans 
of all races and socio-economics are plied with more credit than one could have 
imagined forty years ago. There is more mortgage debt, more credit card debt, 
more auto loan debt and exponentially more student loan debt. Indeed, student 
loans represent the fastest growing share of consumer debt and now exceed 
outstanding credit card or auto loan balances.4 Borrowers owe more than $1 
trillion in student loans held or guaranteed by the federal government and about 
$165 billion to private student loan lenders.5 As a result, student loan debt is 
seen by many as the next big bubble, possibly large enough and precarious 
enough to generate the next big global financial crisis.  
Debt structures carried by people of color are on average more 
disadvantageous than those of other Americans. People of color pay higher 
interest rates on mortgages, student loans, and credit cards even when adjusted 
 
 1 See TERESA SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE FRAGILE MIDDLE 
CLASS 2 (2000). 
 2 Home ownership, one indicator of wealth, tracks these gaps. People of color are less likely to own a 
home than other Americans. As of the fourth quarter of 2019, 73.7% of white Americans owned their home, 
compared to 44% of black Americans, and 48.1% of Latinx Americans. Quarterly Residential Vacancies and 
Homeownership, Fourth Quarter 2019, U.S. Census Bureau (Apr. 7, 2020), https://www.census.gov/housing/ 
hvs/files/currenthvspress.pdf. 
 3 Kimberly Amadeo, Consumer Spending Statistics and Current Trends (Apr. 2, 2020), https://www. 
thebalance.com/consumer-spending-trends-and-current-statistics-3305916 (last visited Apr. 10, 2020); Personal 
Consumption Expenditures/Gross Domestic Product, FRED ECONOMIC DATA (Apr. 29, 2020), https://fred. 
stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=hh3; see also WIKIPEDIA, Consumer Spending, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 
Consumer_spending (stating that “In 1929, consumer spending was 75% of the nation’s economy. This grew to 
83% in 1932, when business spending dropped. Consumer spending dropped to about 50% during World War 
II due to large expenditures by the government and lack of consumer products. Consumer spending in the US 
rose from about 62% of GDP in 1960, where it stayed until about 1981, and has since risen to 71% in 2013.”). 
 4 See Doug Rendleman & Scott Weingart, Collection of Student Loans: A Critical Examination, 20 
WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 215, 216–17 (2014).  
 5 Id. at 217.  
MARTIN_7.15.20 7/15/2020 3:00 PM 
2020] BRINGING RELEVANCE BACK 583 
for income and creditworthiness.6 Their student loans are also larger than other 
Americans’ student loans. This means that debtor-creditor laws have greater 
significance and greater impact or people of color than for other Americans.  
Additionally, despite the endless credit, people in general are less financially 
literate than they were forty years ago, creating a perfect, ever-indebted, storm. 
Finally, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) has been dismantled 
over the past few years and is no longer policing lending products.7 
Consumer bankruptcy has never been a panacea, but it has become even less 
useful to consumers. Using data generated before the 2005 Amendments, 
Professors Deborah Thorne and Katie Porter showed that one year after filing 
for chapter 7, one in four debtors were struggling to pay routine bills, and one in 
three faced a financial situation similar to, or worse than, when they filed.8 The 
2005 Amendments made consumer bankruptcy far less useful to the average 
consumer. The amendments limited the secured debts that could be stripped 
down in a chapter 13, attempted to make more debtors file chapter 13 cases 
versus chapter 7 cases, and added further costly impediments to filing such as 
required financial literacy classes. Prior Code amendments limited the 
dischargeability of student loans. There is no doubt that the Code is less 
consumer-friendly today than it was prior to 2005.  
This Paper presumes that readers want to make bankruptcy more useful for 
consumers and for society as a whole. If this is true, we need to ask two 
questions: first, what do individual consumers hope to get out of the system, and 
second, what does society hope to get out of the system? In other words, what is 
it that we expect the system to accomplish and what are its goals? While 
consumers may also want other things out of a bankruptcy system, most would 
like to discharge as many debts as possible and to keep as much of their property 
as possible, including their houses and cars. What society seeks from the system 
is more complex, but few would disagree that if we are going to have a consumer 
bankruptcy system, it should be useful.  
 
 6 See Pamela Foohey, Lender Discrimination, Black Churches, and Bankruptcy, 54 HOUS. L. REV. 1079, 
1096–98 (2017); see generally Pamela Foohey, Access to Consumer Bankruptcy, 34 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 341 
(2018); Pamela Foohey, Robert M. Lawless, Katherine Porter, & Deborah Thorne, “No Money Down” 
Bankruptcy, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 1055 (2017); Andrea Freeman, Racism in the Credit Card Industry, 95 N.C. L. 
Rev. 1071, 1073–74 (2017) (showing that credit card companies charge more fees, higher interest rates, and 
impose other costly conditions on black and Latinx customers). 
 7 See infra notes 57–72 and accompanying text.  
 8 See generally Katherine Porter & Deborah Thorne, The Failure of Bankruptcy’s Fresh Start, 92 
CORNELL L. REV. 67 (2006) (A large swath of chapter 7 bankruptcy debtors are no better off a year later. This 
article depressed me so much that I switched my research focus from bankruptcy law to consumer law shortly 
after reading it.).  
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Consumer bankruptcy can be useful again, through Code changes that could 
also play a role in stabilizing the economy.9 First, all secured debts could be 
subject to strip-down, including home mortgages. This one change could create 
more prudence among home lenders and help stabilize the housing market and 
the global economy. Second, student loans could also be subject to discharge, 
after a few years of payment.10 Finally, consumer debtors should have a more 
significant marker of their new fresh start, perhaps a celebration and forgiveness 
hearing to usher in his or her new life. All of these changes could support 
important societal values, such as education, homeownership, and stable of 
neighborhoods and communities. All could help make people happier and 
healthier, which would save society money but also create value beyond 
economics. Finally, allowing people to be and feel heard, whatever that may 
mean in the consumer bankruptcy context, could drastically increase the 
relevance of the bankruptcy system without costing much in return.  
Part I of this Paper discusses the increase in debt over the last two decades, 
the growing wage and income gap, growing debt inequality and race, and the 
fall of the CFPB, all justifications for using the bankruptcy system to help 
ameliorate these problems. Part II discusses particular ways the Code could be 
amended to become more relevant, including allowing all secured debt to be 
stripped down and allowing more student loans to be discharged. Part III 
discusses the main policy justifications for our consumer bankruptcy system and 
suggests a third system modification that would make bankruptcy more relevant 
for consumers, namely a hearing or other forum in which consumers could be 
publicly forgiven of their debts and perhaps even be heard about their financial 
woes through the bankruptcy court system. Every litigant longs to be heard, 
perhaps even more so than to win. Providing the ability to be and feel heard in 
bankruptcy would serve consumer bankruptcy debtors at little cost to anyone 
else.  
 
 9 Adam Levitin, Helping Homeowners: Modification of Mortgages in Bankruptcy, 3 HARVARD L. & 
POL’Y REV. 1, 9 (Online) (Jan. 19, 2009) [hereinafter Levitin, Helping Homeowners] (available at http://www. 
hlpronline.com/Levitin_HLPR_011909.pdf). Again, this is questionable, given that individuals of modest means 
play less of a role in fueling the economy than they once did.  
 10 Another way to increase relevance is to make consumer bankruptcy friendlier to low-income people. 
We know that bankruptcy is primarily a middle-class phenomenon, but as the middle class shrinks, so does 
consumer bankruptcy’s relevance. To make the system more useful for low-income Americans, the informa 
pauperis (free fee) provisions could be expanded, there could be more education to attorneys about how to use 
bankruptcy to discharge high-cost credit such as payday and title loans, and more non-profit providers could be 
created to do free bankruptcies. While none of this will solve the primary problem faced by those with financial 
problems, which is low wages, it will be a step in the direction of creating relevance in our consumer bankruptcy 
system.  
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None of these suggestions are new, but all are more necessary and relevant 
now that debt levels are so high and that wealth and debt gaps are so large, and 
now that the CFPB is so disempowered. These suggestions are even more 
necessary to Americans of color given that they are more likely to have 
predatory home loans and high-cost student loans and given that discrimination 
in credit markets persists despite laws against these practices. The bankruptcy 
system can be amended to begin to close these gaps and aid in ameliorating these 
practices. Whether we make changes such as those suggested here, and by many 
others before, will depend upon the kind of nation we want to be, and on the 
values we choose to embrace. One of those values could be the value of our 
human lives, measured in health, financial stability, equanimity, and well-being. 
I. THE DISCONNECT BETWEEN CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY LAW AND 
MODERN CONSUMER CREDIT 
Part I discusses modern reasons why we need to amend the Code to be more 
helpful to consumers, including the increase in debt over the last two decades, 
the growing wage and income gap, growing debt inequality and race, and the 
fall of the CFPB. 
A. The Rise of the Debt Nation 
Overall, Americans are in worse financial shape today than they were in 
1978. Every year since 2013, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
Bank has created a Report on the Economic Well-Being of U.S. Households.11 
In the last report, economic fragility persisted across the U.S., particularly 
related to income and educational attainment as they relate to ethnicity and 
race.12 The report showed that, similar to prior reports, an unexpected expense 
of $400 would force more than one-third of American adults into a difficult 
financial situation and that one quarter of all adults had no retirement savings, 
and skipped necessary medical care in 2018 because they could not afford the 
cost.13 
 
 11 Report on Economic Well-Being of U.S. Households, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS. 
(2019), https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/2018-report-economic-well-being-us-households-
201905.pdf.  
 12 Eric Rosenbaum, Millions of Americans are only $400 Away from Financial Hardship. Here’s Why, 
CBNC, (May 23, 2019, 12:47 PM EDT), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/05/23/millions-of-americans-are-only-
400-away-from-financial-hardship.html. 
 13 Id. The survey showed that the decade-long economic expansion and the low unemployment has failed 
to narrow the persistent economic disparities by race, education, and geography. While nearly eight in ten whites 
are at least doing okay financially, two-thirds of blacks and Hispanics reported being “at least doing okay 
financially.” 
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In August 2007, there was so much credit in our system that it crashed the 
entire global economic structure.14 The crash resulted from creditor and investor 
greed combined with irrational consumer behavior and government inaction, a 
perfect storm.15 In this crisis, the credit gorge was on real estate credit but this is 
not the last crash we will see. Today, most defaulted loans are home mortgages.16 
Auto loans are the second most common driver of accumulated bad debt, with 
credit cards coming in third.17 Finally, student loan debt has quadrupled in the 
past three decades. True, more students have gone to college, but comparatively 
the person by person cost of an individual education has outpaced all other 
consumer cost increases.  
Debt reduces spending, particularly when wages are down.18 It has taken a 
long time for consumer spending to bounce back after the Great Recession, in 
part because millions of people went back to school to find new careers, which 
cut down on available income and also resulted in these high student loan debt 
amounts. During the crisis, Americans racked up so much still-unpaid mortgage 
debt and credit card debt that some say consumer spending may never recover 
to pre-recession levels.19 The spending may have slowed but growth in that debt 
has not.20  
Writing about the 2001 recession in 2004, Professor David Lander explained 
that “[c]onsumer spending and borrowing patterns during and after the 2001 
recession departed significantly from historic norms. United States households 
in 2002 continued to spend and borrow at a record pace even as personal 
bankruptcy filings reached record levels.”21 He further noted that according to 
 
 14 See Aaron Unterman, Innovative Destruction-Structured Finance and Credit Market Reform in the 
Bubble Era, 5 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 53, 53–54 (2009). 
 15 Id. at 53–54. 
 16 Tina Rosenberg, Out of Prison, Into a Vicious Circle of Debt, N.Y. TIMES BLOG (June 9, 2011), 
https://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/06/09/out-of-prison-into-a-vicious-circle-of-debt/. 
 17 Credit cards in particular are a more dangerous form of loan, as they are often used to pay off other 
debts, like auto loans, when people do not have enough money for those payments. Amy Traub and Catherine 
Ruetschlin, DEMOS, The Plastic Safety Net: Findings from the 2012 National Survey on Credit Card Debt of 
Low- and Middle-Income Households 1, 9 (2012) (Forty percent of low- and middle-income households use 
credit cards “to pay for basic living expenses such as rent, mortgage payments, groceries, utilities, or insurance 
. . . because they did not have enough money in their checking or savings accounts.”). 
 18 Amadeo, supra note 3. 
 19 See Bruce Drake, Fed Report Says Household Borrowing is Rebounding from Great Recession, PEW 
RESEARCH CTR. (Feb. 19, 2014), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/02/19/fed-report-says-household-
borrowing-is-rebounding-from-great-recession/; see also Paul Taylor et al., A Balance Sheet at 20 Months How 
the Great Recession Has Changed Life in America, PEW RESEARCH CTR. 26–30 (June 30, 2010), https://www. 
pewsocialtrends.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2010/11/759-recession.pdf. 
 20 See Paul Taylor et al., supra note 19, at 26–30. 
 21 David A. Lander, “It ‘is’ The Best of Times, It ‘is’ The Worst of Times”: A Short Essay on Consumer 
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the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), a revolution in consumer 
lending and a new lending culture has provided consumers much greater access 
to credit and banking services than ever before.22 He asked whether the increased 
costs of survival forced consumers to use increased access to credit to plug the 
holes in their safety net, or whether instead consumers were choosing to 
purchase luxuries they cannot afford and ought not to buy. He mostly noted the 
astronomical amount of debt.23 
Regarding changes since the 1978 Code was enacted, Lander noted that in 
the twenty-five years since that Code was enacted, growth in consumer credit in 
the United States was staggering: 
Consumer debt increased from $288,044 billion to $1,977,824 billion 
from 1980 to 2003; revolving consumer debt, which consists mainly 
of credit card debt, increased from $58,506 billion to $728,429 billion 
in that same period. This explosive growth in consumer credit has had 
massive economic and sociological consequences on individual 
households, on the health of financial institutions and on the American 
economy and American society. These consequences range from 
extraordinarily positive to inordinately negative.24 
Lander further noted that the elimination of price controls that historically 
existed regarding the extension of credit has created profit opportunities for 
lenders but has not always been helpful to consumers. Often the resulting 
products, which typically are subject to no usury caps, have radically changed 
the nature of consumer lending and consumer borrowing by providing an 
extraordinary profit opportunity to financial institutions but left consumers with 
extremely expensive credit options. 25  
Lander eerily portended that “the United States economy and the current 
system of consumer lending intentionally put credit in the hands of large 
numbers of people who are certain to default,” noting that this was a significant 
change from the system as it functioned twenty-five years ago when the 1978 
Code was enacted.26 He then discussed the effects of the consumer lending 
revolution on the consumer bankruptcy system, suggesting that bankruptcy 
policy must be adjusted to provide a partial substitute for the withdrawn 
protection in the consumer credit world. While his article is primarily a plea 
 
Bankruptcy after the Revolution, 78 AM. BANKR. L.J. 201 (2004) (citation omitted). 
 22 Id. at 201 (citation omitted). 
 23 Id. at 202. 
 24 Id. at 202. 
 25 Id. 
 26 Id. at 203.  
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against the proposed 2005 Amendments, it considered the identical concerns 
addressed here, but fifteen years ago. The situation for consumers as a whole, 
and particularly for consumers of color, has only gotten worse in those fifteen 
years.27  
B. The Growing Wage and Income Gap 
Income inequality is growing faster in the U.S. than ever before.28 Between 
1963 and 2016, families in the bottom ten percent of the wealth distribution went 
from having no wealth and no debt to owing an average of $1,000 each.29 Those 
in the middle income group more than doubled their wealth, but families in the 
top ten percent saw wealth increase sevenfold. In 1963, families near the top had 
six times the wealth of families in the middle but by 2016, these top earners had 
twelve times the wealth of families in the middle.30 Stated another way, since 
the 1980s, the top ten percent has amassed roughly forty-three percent of the 
total income and economic growth in our economy.31 Since the Code was 
enacted, income inequality has transformed our country from a land of economic 
promise to one of diminished opportunity for most Americans.32  
The rich are getting richer and the poor, poorer, but people of color in all 
income ranges are losing ground more quickly than other Americans.33 Both the 
income gap and the wealth gap between black and white Americans has 
increased since the Great Recession.34 In 2016, the median income for white 
 
 27 See id. at 202. Discussing home mortgage, Lander notes that mortgage debt twenty-five years ago 
constituted the overwhelming majority of all consumer debt, due to increasing levels of home ownership, a rise 
in home values, low interest rates, and a proliferation in refinancing loans and home equity loans. Id. at 206–07. 
 28 Urban Institute, Nine Charts about Wealth Inequality in America (Updated) (Oct. 5, 2017), https://apps. 
urban.org/features/wealth-inequality-charts/. 
 29 Id.  
 30 Id. I hesitate to call them “earners” since most are wealthy due to family money rather than hard work.  
 31 Liu Baodong, Social Capital, Race, and Income Inequality in the United States, 9 SUSTAINABILITY 
248, 1 (2017). 
 32 See generally RONALD P. FORMISANO, PLUTOCRACY IN AMERICA: HOW INCREASING INEQUALITY 
DESTROYS THE MIDDLE CLASS AND EXPLOITS THE POOR (2015).  
 33 Rodney E. Hero & Morris E. Levy, The Racial Structure of Economic Inequality in the United States: 
Understanding Change and Continuity in an Era of “Great Divergence,” 97 SOC. SCI. QUARTERLY 491, 498 
(2016).  
 34 On Views of Race and Inequality, Blacks and Whites Are Worlds Apart, PEW RESEARCH CTR. 4, 21–24 
(2016), https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2016/06/ST_2016.06.27_Race-Inequality-
Final.pdf. Professor Robert Manduca tells a slightly more nuanced story. See Robert Manduca, Income 
Inequality and the Persistence of Racial Economic Disparities, 5 SOCIOLOGICAL SCI. 182 (2018). According to 
Manduca, more than fifty years after the Civil Rights Act, family income disparities between African Americans 
and white Americans are not growing but are the same today as they were in 1968. He claims that from 1968 to 
2016, these disparities in family income narrowed by almost one-third, but that this relative gain was negated by 
changes to the national income distribution that resulted in rapid income growth for the richest and whitest 
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Americans was $48,000, while the median income for black Americans was 
$31,100, meaning black Americans make about sixty-five percent of what white 
Americans make,35 a gap that has remained the same, or worsened, since 1976.36 
Income gaps among Hispanics are similar. In 2014, the median income of 
households headed by Hispanic Americans was approximately the same as 
households headed by black Americans.37 Since 1970, the median income of 
households headed by Hispanic Americans has been a little over half of the 
median income of households headed by white Americans.38 In 1970, the 
median income of households headed by Hispanic Americans was sixty-seven 
percent of the median income of white households and in 2014, the median 
income of households headed by Hispanic Americans was sixty-one percent of 
the median income of white households.39  
While income inequality relates to wages, wealth inequality relates to net 
worth. Compared to income disparities, racial wealth disparities are far larger 
and generationally persistent.40 Black Americans’ net wealth is one-tenth of that 
of white Americans, and over recent decades, white families have accumulated 
wealth at three times the rate of black families.41 Home ownership is one proxy 
for wealth given that the more one has, the more likely one is to own a home. 
The racial homeownership gap contributes to the wealth gap because home 
ownership often represents the lion’s share of a family’s wealth.42 As of 2014, 
seventy-two percent of white Americans owned their home, compared to forty-
 
Americans. Id. at 182.  
 35 Rakesh Kochhar & Anthony Cilluffo, Income of Whites, Blacks, Hispanics and Asians in the U.S., 1970 
and 2016, PEW RESEARCH CTR., (July 21, 2018), https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2018/07/12/incomes-of-
whites-blacks-hispanics-and-asians-in-the-u-s-1970-and-2016/.  
 36 On Views of Race and Inequality, Blacks and Whites Are Worlds Apart, PEW RESEARCH CTR., SOCIAL 
AND DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS 21 (2016), https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2016/06/ 
ST_2016.06.27_Race-Inequality-Final.pdf. This is seventy-seven percent. 
 37 Id. at 21–22. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. Since 1987, the median income of households headed by Asian Americans has either been the same 
or more then the median income of households headed by white Americans. People of color are also more likely, 
over all time periods, to be unemployed. Valerie Wilson, State Unemployment by Race and Ethnicity, ECON. 
POLICY INST. (May 2019), https://www.epi.org/indicators/state-unemployment-by-race-and-ethnicity/. 
 40 Darrick Hamilton & Michael Linden, Hidden Rules of Race Are Embedded in the New Tax Law, 
ROOSEVELT INST. 1 (2018), https://rooseveltinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Hidden-Rules-of-Race-
and-Trump-Tax-Law.pdf; THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, TOXIC INEQUALITY: HOW AMERICA’S WEALTH GAP DESTROYS 
MOBILITY, DEEPENS THE RACIAL DIVIDE, AND THREATENS OUR FUTURE (2017). The reasons for these disparities 
in wealth include everything from neighborhoods to employment to tax laws. 
 41 SHAPIRO, supra note 40.  
 42 Amy Traub et al., The Racial Wealth Gap: Why Policy Matters, DEMOS 1, 9 (2016), https://www. 
demos.org/sites/default/files/publications/RacialWealthGap_2.pdf [hereinafter Traub et al., Racial Wealth Gap]. 
The report defines the racial wealth gap “as the absolute difference in wealth holdings between the median 
household among populations grouped by race or ethnicity.” Id. at 7. 
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three of black Americans.43 While the percent of black Americans who own their 
home has stayed approximately the same since 1970,44 white American 
homeownership increased from sixty-nine percent to seventy-two percent over 
the same period.45 As with education, the homeownership gap persists when 
adjusted for income levels.46 Sixty-seven percent of upper middle class black 
Americans owned their home compared to eighty-four percent of upper middle 
class white Americans, and fifty-eight percent of black Americans with college 
degrees own their home compared to seventy-six percent of white Americans 
with college degrees.47 In summary, income, wealth, and home ownership gaps 
persist over all time periods, despite antidiscrimination laws and increased 
education levels among people of color. Below we explore why.  
C. Growing Debt Inequality and Race 
While debt has increased overall in the system, the bottom ninety-five 
percent have seen debt increase significantly while income has remained flat.48 
More specifically, thirty-five years ago in 1983, the bottom ninety-five percent 
had $.62 of debt for every dollar earned. By 2007, this ratio of debt to earnings 
had risen to $1.48 of debt for every dollar of earnings.49 Today, in 2019, the debt 
levels are higher and growing. While credit is more available to the bottom 
ninety-five percent now than ever before, this debt is also being used to try to 
close the wealth gap.50 High debt levels among the general population 
exacerbate the wealth gap, but also have implications for the overall economy. 
The only times we have seen this level of debt in our economy were just before 
the Great Depression and just before the Great Recession.51  
 
 43 Id. The report found that as of 2011, seventy-three percent of white families owned their home, forty-
five percent of black families owned their home, and forty-seven percent of Latino families owned their home. 
Id. at 9.  
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. A gap between white American homeownership and Hispanic homeownership also exists. In 2014, 
forty-five percent of Hispanic Americans owned their home. 
 48 Tami Lubby, Debt Inequality is the New Income Inequality, CNN MONEY (May 2, 2012), 
https://money.cnn.com/2012/05/02/news/economy/income-debt-inequality/index.htm. 
 49 Id. The top five percent of earners saw the opposite phenomenon. This cohort’s debt was $.76 per dollar 
of earnings in 1983, but just $.64 per dollar in 2007. Id.  
 50 Id. According to Robert Reich, former labor secretary under President Clinton and an author who writes 
about income inequality, “as their wages have dropped, some Americans were forced to take on more debt just 
to stay in place . . . .” Id. 
 51 Id. 
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On an individual basis, a steady diet of the most expensive forms of credit 
can create an unsurmountable barrier to wealth creation.52 Credit terms for 
people of color are worse than for white people, even when controlling for 
income. Part of the reason ethnic minorities were so hard hit by the Great 
Recession was because of the type of debt many carry. Many are unbanked, 
which creates less opportunities to build wealth, as well as fewer opportunities 
to borrow money at competitive rates.53 Many minorities also face racial 
discrimination in credit markets54 and are more likely than white people to think 
lenders have their best interests in mind.55  
D. The Fall of the CFPB 
While debt has grown and made debt relief more necessary, policing credit 
products has become a thing of the past, at least on a national level. As it stands, 
in 2020, the CFPB is no longer in the enforcement business. Although CFPB 
successfully brought steady enforcement actions during the Obama 
Administration, the CFPB has slowed its enforcement in every part of the credit 
world under the Trump Administration, in monthly rate of actions, industry type, 
and settlement or penalty amounts, all in direct contradiction to then-presidential 
candidate Trump’s promises to crack down on Wall Street in favor of the middle 
class.56  
For example, under Director Richard Cordray, the CFPB recovered $12 
billion in financial relief for consumers.57 Mr. Cordray’s CFPB averaged 3.2 
 
 52 Id. 
 53 Michelle Maroto, Growing Farther Apart: Racial and Ethnic Inequality in Household Wealth Across 
the Distribution, 3 SOCIOLOGICAL SCI. 801, 804 (2016). 
 54 Even in 2020, even middle- and higher-income minority populations still deal with racism and 
discrimination in credit markets, which affects the credit rates for which they qualify. Professor Andrea Freeman 
has shown that, unrelated to risk, credit card companies charge more fees, higher interest rates, and other 
conditions on black and Latino customers. Andrea Freeman, Racism in the Credit Card Industry, 195 N. C. L. 
REV. 1071, 1098–1102 (2017).  
 55 Elizabeth Warren & Oren Bar-Gill, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 132 (2008), stating 
that: 
[t]he 2002 Fannie Mae National Housing Survey found that over half of all African-American 
and Hispanic borrowers erroneously believed that lenders are required by law to provide the best 
possible loan rates. They might know that they did not fully understand mortgage rates, but their 
misplaced trust in lenders and mortgage brokers gave them false confidence that their lack of 
knowledge did not harm them. In such cases, market imperfections are magnified. 
 56 See Collin Gillespie, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau is Failing, draft on file with author 
(citing Presidential Candidate Donald Trump, Campaign Speech in Ottumwa, Iowa (Jan. 9, 2016) (“I’m not 
gonna let Wall Street get away with murder . . . .”)).  
 57 See Collin Gillespie, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau is Failing, draft on file with author 
(citing CFPB Director Richard Corday, Prepared Remarks at the National Community Reinvestment Coalition 
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cases per month over his five-year directorship,58 and these actions led to an 
average return of $43 million in restitution to consumers per week.59 Under 
Director Mick Mulvaney, this figure declined to $6.4 million per week.60 When 
Mr. Mulvaney became director of the CFPB, his organization brought only one 
case in his first four months.61 Although the case was against one of the biggest 
banks in the country, Wells Fargo, the enforcement action was largely seen as 
unavoidable as President Trump had previously tweeted his outrage upon 
learning about Wells Fargo’s various infractions.62 Under the agreement 
between the CFPB and Wells Fargo, consumers did not see a dime returned to 
them unless they were individually able to prove direct financial harm to the 
dollar.63  
Additionally, many of the types of enforcement actions brought during the 
Obama Administration have simply stopped under the Trump Administration. 
Student loan lending abuses have fallen from a total of fifteen cases securing 
$47.5 million in restitution under Director Cordray to zero cases under 
Mulvaney.64 Equal Opportunity Credit Reporting Act cases, which are designed 
to prevent discrimination in connection with lending, has similarly fallen from 
over half a billion dollars over eleven cases to zero dollars from zero cases.65 
This decline has continued under the new leadership of Director Kathleen 
Kraninger. The CFPB has averaged one case per month under Director 
Kraninger and the weekly return in restitution to the consumer under Kraninger 
has fallen to all-time low of $925,000 per week.66 There have been no 
enforcement actions taken against the large banks or credit card companies. 
 
Conference (Mar. 29, 2017), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/prepared-remarks-cfpbdirector-
richard-cordray-national-community-reinvestment-coalition-conference/). 
 58 See Collin Gillespie, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau is Failing, draft on file with author 
(citing Jesse Eisinger, The CFPB’s Declaration of Independence, PROPUBLICA (Feb. 15, 2018), https://www. 
propublica.org/article/consumer-financial-protection-bureau-declaration-of-dependence). 
 59 See Collin Gillespie, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau is Failing, draft on file with author 
(citing Christopher L. Peterson et al., Response Regarding Bureau Enforcement Processes (Docket No. CFPB-
2018-0003) (2018)). 
 60 Peterson, supra note 59, at 5. 
 61 Id. 
 62 See Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Dec. 8, 2017, 7:18 AM), https://twitter.com/ 
realDonaldTrump/status/939152197090148352. 
 63 See id. (citing Mick Mulvaney’s Wells Fargo Settlement Lets the Bank Decide How Consumers Are 
Paid Back, THE INTERCEPT (Apr. 26, 2018), https://theintercept.com/2018/04/26/wells-fargo-cfpb-mick-mulvaney/ 
(last accessed Nov. 25, 2019)). 
 64 See Collin Gillespie, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau is Failing, draft on file with author 
(citing Peterson, supra note 59).  
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. 
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Instead, the CFPB has concentrated on a handful of small payday loan 
companies, student loan servicers, and illegal debt collectors, with the lone 
exception of the credit reporting company, Equifax.67 The Equifax case, like the 
Wells Fargo case, was too large to ignore once in the public eye and that one 
very public enforcement action alone is responsible for eighty-five percent of 
the financial relief secured on behalf of consumers under Kraninger’s watch, a 
total of $674 million.68 Although Kraninger has brought three enforcement 
actions in connection with deceptive or misleading practices, the Director settled 
each case without any monetary restitution, in contrast to Cordray, who secured 
$94 million per case over a total of 116 cases.69 Overall, the number of cases 
announced in 2018 was down eighty percent from its all-time high in 2015.70 
Additionally, the average amount per case returned to consumers is down 
ninety-six percent.71 Now more than ever, consumers need the CFPB’s help.  
II. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO BANKRUPTCY IRRELEVANCE 
Moving now to how bankruptcy might assist with these racial inequities, 
scholars have suggested promising ways to make consumer bankruptcy more 
relevant. For example, as a solution to the fact that consumer bankruptcy was 
losing its relevance even twenty-five years ago, David Lander offered the 
following suggestions prior to the enactment of the 2005 Amendments and prior 
to the Great Recession: 
1. Regulate sub-prime lending in order to establish an upper limit on 
the cost of credit and restrictions or prohibitions on the most 
nefarious lending products and practices; 
2. Provide a floor on exemptions; 
3. Implement and evaluate kindergarten through college and adult 
financial literacy programs, as well as savings incentive programs 
such as the individual development account; 
4. If the recent spate of home equity withdrawals results in a cycle of 
massive home foreclosures that current Chapter 13 cannot 
ameliorate, amend the Bankruptcy Code to help forestall the tragedy 
caused by such massive foreclosures; and 
 
 67 See Collin Gillespie, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau is Failing, draft on file with author; 
see also data publicly available at the CFPB’s official website, https://www.consumerfinance.gov. 
 68 Id. 
 69 See id. (citing Peterson, supra note 59). 
 70 See id. (citing Peterson, supra note 59). 
 71 Id.  
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5. Withstand the current pressure to make bankruptcy more restrictive 
and leave the consumer provisions of the Code alone.72 
While we know Lander’s fifth suggestion fell on deaf ears, and that suggestions 
one and four might have helped stave off the foreclosure crisis to some degree, 
it is time to revisit these and other solutions.73 Around the same time, Professor 
David Skeel suggested allowing the strip down of home mortgages, primarily to 
address racial inequalities in credit systems.74 Katie Porter and Deborah Thorne 
call for replacement of the means test, job training, broadened unemployment 
benefits, better insurance, health care, social programs that encourage savings, 
and early financial literacy training, which are all also excellent solutions.75  
In Part II, I focus on two changes that would appear to have the biggest 
impact on improving consumer financial health, particularly the financial health 
of consumers of color, who have fallen even further behind economically in the 
past four decades. First, allowing the strip down of all secured debt in chapter 
13, and second, allowing for the discharge of all student loans. While these 
suggestions are not new, the rationales for them have become stronger over the 
past decade.  
 
 72 Lander, supra note 21, at 217–18. 
 73 Everyone knows the 2005 Amendments increased consumer costs to file for bankruptcy. Lander notes 
that if the costs of bankruptcy increase, which they have under the 2005 Amendments, fewer will file. Id. at 217. 
Collections will intensify and debtors might jeopardize her home or car as a result of trying to pay her unsecured 
creditors in full. Consumers may never file at all, and there may be an: 
uptick in collections and a significant increase in stress, family violence, mental illness, divorce 
and suicide. If we assume that many borrowers are making unwise decisions, then it is possible 
that in the long run, in the face of a higher bankruptcy bar, with better education they will make 
wiser decisions and borrow less. If we assume that most consumers get in trouble without making 
unwise decisions, then they will continue to borrow at about the same rate. 
If the bar to filing bankruptcy is lowered, then marginal potential debtors will opt into bankruptcy 
and debts that may have been uncollectible as well as debts that might have been collectible will 
be written off officially. The set of those borrowers that would file if it were easier but not if it 
were harder are likely to be difficult candidates for collection even if they do not file. The battle 
between the most credit risky borrower and her creditors (or the purchasers of her debt) is a saga 
of calls, letters, and sometimes lawsuits, judgments and collection efforts. The stronger the case 
for bankruptcy the less leverage the collector has.  
Id. 
 74 David A. Skeel, Jr., Racial Dimensions of Credit and Bankruptcy, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1694, 1723 
(2004). In 2004, legal historian David Skeel explored the racial dimensions of credit and bankruptcy in 
Philadelphia, and credit bankruptcy and race in general from the 1800s to the present. He describes the legal 
practice of two prominent Black Philadelphia lawyers in the mid-1900s, noting that bankruptcy was not part of 
their legal practice. He chronicles the importance of social capital in obtaining credit, which was true for all 
Americans but particularly for middle class black Americans, and ultimately discusses the ways in which the 
black community ends up taking out less desirable credit. Id. at 1713–14. 
 75 Porter & Thorne, supra note 8, at 118–121.  
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A. Allow all Secured Debt to Be Stripped Down in Chapter 13 
Since homes and cars are typically a consumer’s most valuable assets, and 
since keeping these assets could make the difference between working and not 
working, and living in a home versus experiencing homelessness, allowing 
consumers to more easily save these assets could greatly increase their quality 
of life and thus improve society. It also does not appear that mortgage and auto 
loan pricing are sensitive to possible bankruptcy losses, meaning that while 
borrowers would benefit, lenders would not suffer in a way they themselves 
deem financially meaningful. 76  
1. Allowing Strip Down of Home Mortgages in Chapter 13 
In the mortgage arena, ethnic minorities are more likely to carry subprime 
mortgages even when they qualify for better ones.77 For example, black 
American and Latino borrowers are five times more likely to take out high-
interest (sub-prime) mortgage loans than white people.78 Stated differently, in 
2002, over forty percent of subprime purchase mortgages and twenty-five 
percent of refinanced loans went to black Americans, despite that they made up 
just thirteen percent of the population.79 These statistics were from before the 
Great Recession.  
Once subprime lending practices were in full swing, even higher percentages 
of high-interest mortgage loans went to minorities.80 In terms of the mechanics 
of how this happened, Chris Odinet explains it well in his book, Foreclosed.81 
Wells Fargo and other lenders targeted black borrowers for refinancing.82 
Lenders referred to subprime loans made in minority communities as “ghetto 
loans” and to borrowers as mud people, people who do not pay their bills, and 
 
 76 This would also make life simpler for bankruptcy attorneys and cheaper for bankruptcy debtors. I 
noticed the complexity of all these different strip down rules in my introductory bankruptcy class this semester, 
which creates a perverse system in which chapter 13 becomes more complex on this issue than chapter 11. While 
strip down was once a major feature of chapter 13, with all the current exceptions it is far less important.  
 77 Maroto, supra note 53, at 804; see also Warren & Bar-Gill, supra note 55, at 66 (noting that “minority 
borrowers are incurring prices on their loans that are higher than is warranted by their credit characteristics.”).  
 78 Creola Johnson, The Magic of Groups Identity: How Predatory Lenders Use Minorities to Target 
Communities of Color, 17 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 165, 178 (2010).  
 79 Id.; see also The Black Population in the United States: March 2002, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2003), 
https://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/p20-541.pdf. 
 80 Johnson, supra note 78, at 177; see also Abbye Atkinson, Modifying Mortgage Discrimination in 
Consumer Bankruptcy, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 1041, 1044 (2015) [hereinafter Atkinson, Modifying Mortgage 
Discrimination].  
 81 CHRISTOPHER ODINET, FORECLOSED: MORTGAGE SERVING AND THE HIDDEN ARCHITECTURE OF 
HOMEOWNERSHIP IN AMERICA 21 (2019). 
 82 Id. 
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people with bad credit.83 Some lenders targeted religious borrowers by holding 
events at black churches.84  
By the time the financial crisis hit in 2008, fifty percent of all loans made to 
black borrowers were subprime and black borrowers were 2.4 times as likely as 
white people to be in a subprime loan,85 despite how many qualified for less 
expensive loans.86 The negative effects of the crisis on acquired wealth fell 
disproportionately on families of color.87 While the average white family saw an 
eleven percent drop in wealth as a result of the crisis, in the same period black 
families saw wealth decline by thirty-one percent and Hispanic families, by 
forty-five percent.88 In short, persons of color suffered more and not by a small 
margin. 
The foreclosure crisis crushed the entire economy, but also upset hundreds 
of thousands of individual lives, upending entire communities and disrupting 
friendships, religious congregations, schools, childcare, medical care, 
transportation, and even employment.89  
Following the 2008 financial crisis, it became clear that lenders had become 
less careful, if not downright reckless, in their freewheeling lending. Some 
specifically targeted the poor with high-interest loans. Indeed, the Dodd Frank 
Act and the resulting CFPB were created and implemented in large part to 
correct what went wrong in the financial crisis.90 While it was clear following 
the crisis that much greater care more and diligent underwriting was needed to 
avoid another crisis, very little actually changed.91  
Moreover, non-banks or shadow banks, such as many mortgage servicers, 
are not well regulated yet and are servicing more and more mortgages.92 Shadow 
banks escape most forms of consumer protections, including the Truth in 
Lending Act, the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, and pretty much every law 
that protects consumers. Shortly after Dodd-Frank was passed, shadow banks 
 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. at 22. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. at 37. 
 88 Id. 
 89 Adam Levitin, Resolving the Foreclosure Crisis: Modification of Mortgages in Bankruptcy, 2009 WIS. 
L. REV. 565, 569 (2009) [hereinafter Levitin, Resolving the Foreclosure Crisis].  
 90 Creating the Consumer Bureau, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, https://www.consumerfinance.gov/ 
about-us/the-bureau/creatingthebureau/ (last visited Dec. 12, 2019).  
 91 ODINET, supra note 81, at 158. 
 92 Id. at 7–8, 123–26. 
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held just 6.8% of the mortgage servicing rights in the United States.93 The other 
93.4% of mortgages were serviced by banks. By 2015, this percentage had 
increased to about twenty-five percent with some estimates as high as thirty-one 
percent of all mortgages.94 Shadow banks also are not required to retain reserves 
for their future obligations and most non-bank servicers are still 
undercapitalized.95 These firms are on no way ready to deal with another 
downturn. If we have one, things will likely roll out in exactly the same way.96 
The vulnerability of the economy and of borrowers remain. 97 Moreover, in the 
past, the CFPB did crack down on failures to properly underwrite mortgage 
loans but is no longer doing so, leaving the economy vulnerable to another 
financial crisis similar to the one experienced ten years ago.  
When the 1978 Code was enacted, it allowed debtors to strip down secured 
debts that were in amounts greater than the value of the collateral in a chapter 
13. This ability remains part of the Code today and is consistent with the reality 
that under a state court execution, lenders only recover the value of their 
collateral and are unsecured creditors as to any remaining debt. The protection 
given to home mortgages in bankruptcy is unique. While debtors can modify all 
other types of debts in bankruptcy, by reducing interest rates, stretching out loan 
terms, changing amortization schedules, and limiting secured claims to the value 
of collateral, the Code forbids the modification of mortgage loans secured solely 
by the debtor’s principal residence.98 
The drafters excepted home mortgages from the strip down provisions, 
requiring chapter 13 debtors to pay their entire mortgage regardless of the value 
of the home collateral.99  
 
 93 Id. at 8. 
 94 Indeed, among the mostly subprime, private label mortgages, shadow banks service an alarming 
seventy-four percent of loans. Id. This means that banks are slowly moving their mortgage servicing off-site. 
This makes some degree of economic sense. Banks are more heavily regulated and thus it is more costly for 
them to service loans than for unregulated servicers. Id. It does however leave us vulnerable to another crisis 
unless servicers become more regulated.  
 95 Id. at 122–23. 
 96 Nathalie Martin, Future Financial Crisis Not Foreclosed: Book Review of FORECLOSED: MORTGAGE 
SERVICING AND THE HIDDEN ARCHITECTURE OF HOMEOWNERSHIP IN AMERICA, 28 J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. 329, 332 
(2019). 
 97 Id. 
 98 Levitin, Resolving the Foreclosure Crisis, supra note 89, at 571; 11 U.S.C. §§ 1322(b)(2), 1123(b)(5) 
(2019). 
 99 §§ 1322(b)(2), 1123(b)(5). For most of my life as a bankruptcy attorney, this provision was of little 
consequence. Borrowers were required to put down at least ten percent and often twenty percent of their purchase 
price, creating immediate equity. Moreover, real estate values generally went up, rarely down.  
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The presumptive reason for the exception to the strip down rule was that 
home lenders provided a valuable service to society and deserved special 
protection. More specially, as explained by Chief Justice Stevens in 1993, 
“favorable treatment of residential mortgagees was intended to encourage the 
flow of capital into the home lending market.”100  
There also may have been a sense that if a large number of bankruptcy 
debtors stripped down their mortgages, this could destabilize the home lending 
market and perhaps the economy as a whole. Without question, one fear was that 
lending might dry up for some, due to the possibility of being stripped down in 
bankruptcy.101  
As chronicled by Professor Adam Levitin, the anti-strip down provision was 
a compromise between House and Senate bills. The House bill, H.R. 8200, 
permitted modification of all secured claims, but the Senate bill, S.B. 2266, did 
not. The bills were reconciled through a series of floor amendments, which 
resulted in a ban on modification of loans secured solely by the debtor’s 
principal residence.102  
There was no discussion on the issue in the Congressional Record, and the 
one conversation about this issue sheds little light on this provision’s real 
purpose.103 One insurance industry person noted that allowing strip down could 
cause residential lenders to be “extraordinarily conservative in making loans in 
cases where the general financial resources of the individual borrower are not 
particularly strong.”104 Being conservative in lending was mentioned several 
times in the discussion but as Professor Levitin notes, there was no evidence in 
the legislative history that section 1322(b)(2) was intended to lower the cost of 
mortgage credit or increase its availability.105 The provision disallowing strip 
down of home mortgages was just a compromise that gave a subset of mortgage 
lenders a more favorable position relative to other creditors than they had under 
the 1898 Act.106 
 
 100 Nobelman v. Am. Sav. Bank, 508 U.S. 324, 332 (1993) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 101 See Skeel, supra note 74, at 1710–1711. Skeel explains that if strip down was permitted, there was a 
fear that lenders would have to pass their losses on to the next round of borrowers, which would reduce access 
to credit for future borrow. 
 102 Levitin, Resolving the Foreclosure Crisis, supra note 89, at 573–76. 
 103 Id. at 573–74. This conversation was between Edward J. Kulik, Senior Vice President, Real Estate 
Division, Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co., his counsel, Robert E. O’Malley, of Covington & Burling; 
and Senator Dennis DiConcini (D-Ariz.) Id. at 573–74. 
 104 Id. (comments of Edward J. Kulik, Senior Vice President, Real Estate Division, Massachusetts Mutual 
Life Insurance Co.). 
 105 Id. at 615–16. 
 106 Id. at 573–74. 
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The issue of lender losses, however, seems to be a nonissue. Through 
empirical data, Professor Levitin shows that lenders actually incur greater losses 
on a greater percentage of mortgages in foreclosure than they would in a chapter 
13 strip down and that that mortgage markets are indifferent to strip down risk 
because the number of mortgages that could be modified at any given time is 
small in magnitude.107 Even in the worst real estate markets, and Professor 
Levitin studied one of them in Riverside, California, mortgage lenders would 
not be exposed to substantial losses as a result of strip down.108 The resulting 
losses would be too inconsequential for lenders to care about, and are in any case 
not figured into pricing models. 109 
Turning to the stability of the economy, Professor Levitin argues that 
allowing strip down could provide an effective, fair, immediate, and taxpayer-
cost-free tool for resolving the home mortgage crisis.110 He notes that lenders 
foreclosed even when doing so was financially harmful to them, primarily 
because of contractual impediments, agency costs, practical impediments, and 
other transaction costs. Permitting bankruptcy modification, on the other hand, 
would give homeowners the option to force a workout of the mortgage, subject 
to the limitations provided by the Code, and would encourage voluntary 
modifications, as mortgage lenders would prefer to exercise more control over 
the shape of the modification.111 This would help foster voluntary, private 
solutions to the mortgage crisis. Moreover, this solution is immediately 
available.112 As we know, the HOPE for Homeowners Program, the Making 
Home Affordable Plan, and the other programs designed to stem the tide 
failed.113  
 
 107 Id. at 611. 
 108 Id. at 611–16. 
 109 Levitin further explains that: 
[T]he key to explaining the mortgage market’s relative insensitivity to bankruptcy-modification 
risk lies in mortgage-market sensitivity to foreclosure costs. The market’s indifference to 
bankruptcy-modification risk is because losses due to modification (including strip-down) would 
generally be smaller than those incurred in foreclosure. There is no reason for the market to price 
against bankruptcy modification if bankruptcy modification would result in smaller losses than 
foreclosure. Instead, modification (be it voluntary or in bankruptcy) represents the best realistic 
outcome for a defaulted loan. Moreover, bankruptcy-modification risk is small in likelihood and 
magnitude relative to all the other risk factors that determine mortgage interest rates above the 
cost of funds. 
Id. at 617–18. 
 110 Id. at 576. 
 111 Id.  
 112 Id. 
 113 Susan E. Hauser, Cutting the Gordian Knot: The Case for Allowing Modification of Home Mortgages 
in Bankruptcy, 5 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 207, 208–09 (2010). 
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Virtually all of the original rationales for not allowing strip down suggest 
that, given what has changed in credit markets, we should instead allow strip 
down. First, as to macro-economic concerns, we need to find a way to make 
lending more responsible. Everything that has been tried has failed to change the 
fact that risky loans still occur. Despite Dodd-Frank, lending standards have 
eased almost to their pre-crisis levels. In other words, we could be heading for 
another crisis. Assuming that markets respond at all to bankruptcy debtors’ 
ability to strip down, allowing strip down could help our economy. Bankruptcy 
modification could force lenders to internalize the costs of making poor lending 
decisions through limited recoveries.114 One fear in disallowing strip down was 
that it could dry up lending, which at this point could be a good thing. If it had 
any effect at all, it would be to dry up lending on risker loans, the very loans that 
crashed the economy the last time. Allowing strip down could encourage lenders 
to make safer loans and to do a better job of underwriting the risk.  
Finally, allowing modification would correct two particular problems from 
the last financial crisis, “payment-reset shock from resetting adjustable rate 
mortgages (ARMs), and negative equity from rapidly depreciating home prices 
. . . .”115 This in turn would help stabilize the housing market. As Professor 
Levitin argues, making bankruptcy a forum for distressed homeowners to 
restructure their mortgage debts is both the most moderate and the best method 
for resolving the foreclosure crisis and stabilizing mortgage markets.116  
For many of these reasons, scholars have suggested we allow home 
mortgage strip down and many bills have been drafted and have failed117 but 
might succeed now. We have no CFPB enforcement. We have more mortgage 
 
 114 Levitin, Helping Homeowners, supra note 9, at 7.  
 115 Levitin, Resolving the Foreclosure Crisis, supra note 89, at 648.  
 116 One added benefit of this solution is that windfalls would not go to housing speculators and second 
home purchasers because modification could only happen in the context of a chapter 13 repayment plan. Levitin, 
Helping Homeowners, supra note 9, at 7.  
 117 Levitin, Resolving the Foreclosure Crisis, supra note 89, at 649–50, stating that: 
At the time this Article went to press, Congress was considering legislation to permit modification 
of single-family, principal-residence mortgages in chapter 13 bankruptcy. On March 5, 2009, the 
Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009 passed the House of Representatives; a 
companion bill, the Helping Families Save Their Homes in Bankruptcy Act of 2009 is still in 
committee in the Senate. The Obama administration has endorsed bankruptcy modification with 
some qualifications, but it is uncertain whether the legislation will gain the requisite support to 
pass the Senate absent compromises that would seriously reduce its effectiveness for dealing with 
the foreclosure crisis; in 2008 similar legislation passed the House, and was reported out of the 
Senate Judiciary Committee, but never came to a floor vote.  
Id. 
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debt in the system, and we have credit systems that are more stratified by class 
and race than ever before.  
For individual bankruptcy debtors as a whole, it now makes little sense to 
forbid strip down. Many mortgages are under water now and the home is the 
most valuable asset for most families. Homeownership is a proxy for wealth, as 
well as equity and opportunity,118 and homeownership is consistently associated 
lower neighborhood crime rates, more stable neighborhoods, better outcomes 
for children, and a better economy overall.119 Homes also play a role in upward 
mobility, beyond just the wealth they represent. They represent purpose, 
belonging, and a sense of community beyond one’s self and one’s family.120  
Additionally, borrowers would not get off scot-free or be encouraged to 
engage in moral hazard. To the contrary, they would face the shame of 
bankruptcy, subject themselves to the huge disclosures required by bankruptcy, 
and be subject to a court-supervised budget for three to five years.121  
Allowing strip down has the potential to ameliorate one of the worst effects 
of the financial crisis, the high level of wealth lost in communities of color.122 
The 2008 financial crisis devastated communities of color. For example, middle 
class black families now have less than fifty percent of the wealth they had 
 
 118 The racial homeownership gap contributes to the wealth gap because home ownership often represents 
the lion’s share of a family’s wealth. Traub et al., Racial Wealth Gap, supra note 42, at 9. Home ownership also 
influences broader disparities in net worth. Maroto, supra note 53, at 820. White families are more likely to 
receive inheritance and assistance from family to put down a deposit on a home and can thus own a home earlier, 
and discriminatory practices in lending such as redlining or giving people of color higher interest rate mortgages 
also contribute to the homeownership gap. Traub et al., Racial Wealth Gap, supra note 42, at 9 (defining the 
wealth gap as “the absolute difference in wealth holdings between the median household among populations 
grouped by race or ethnicity.”). Id. at 10; see also Jeffrey P. Thompson & Gustavo Suarez, Updating the Racial 
Wealth Gap (Fin. and Econ. Discussion Series, Working Paper No. 2015-76, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3072923 (describing the role of inheritance and family wealth across racial lines and 
the role of this family money in perpetuating the wealth gap). These researchers claim that wealth differences 
between black and white families derive 100% from different asset holdings, while wealth differences between 
black and Hispanic families result mostly from different debt holdings. Id. at 1. 
 119 Id. The racial homeownership gap also contributes to the wealth gap because home ownership often 
represents the lion’s share of a family’s wealth. Id. at 9. Home ownership also influences broader disparities in 
net worth. Maroto, supra note 53, at 820. White families are more likely to receive inheritance and assistance 
from family to put down a deposit on a home and can thus own a home earlier, and discriminatory practices in 
lending such as redlining or giving people of color higher interest rate mortgages also contribute to the 
homeownership gap. Traub et al., Racial Wealth Gap, supra note 42, at 9. 
 120 Joseph M. Harkness & Sandra J. Newman, Effects of Homeownership on Children: The Role of 
Neighborhood Characteristics and Family Income, ECON. POL’Y REV., FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y. 78, 89 (2003). 
 121 Levitin, Resolving the Foreclosure Crisis, supra note 89, at 577. 
 122 Atkinson, Modifying Mortgage Discrimination, supra note 80, at 1044. 
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accumulated prior to the crisis123 and sixty-six percent for Latino families.124 By 
comparison, white families’ wealth declined by just 14.5% over the same 
period.125 This occurred because black and Latino households held more of their 
wealth in their homes, and also because of massive discrimination in home 
lending, that led more persons of color to be steered into subprime mortgages 
even if they qualified for cheaper ones.126 According to Abbye Atkinson, this 
means middle-class-ascendant minorities paid more for their homes, diverting 
money from retirement savings, college savings, and other wealth-building 
products.127 When the financial crisis dust settled, middle-class black Americans 
and Latinos had lost their homes to foreclosure twice as often as white people.128 
Assuming lenders are at all sensitive to being stripped down, mortgage 
modification has the potential to reverse these discriminatory practices through 
the threat of strip down. Black Americans are more likely to have underwater 
mortgages or live in communities with more underwater homes.129 Allowing 
strip down for this reason is particularly critical and necessary given the 
persistence of discrimination in many credit markets despite laws against these 
practices.130 
Finally, the right of debtors to modify their underwater home loans in 
bankruptcy might finally incentivize lenders to curtail and police discriminatory 
lending practices that decades of anti-discrimination legislation and policy have 
failed to stamp out.131 Modifying the outdated anti-strip down provision could 
help police lender behavior, while enabling economically disenfranchised and 
financially distressed homeowners, many of whom are subject to discriminatory 
lending practices, to hang on to their homes through financial crises. This one 
 
 123 Id. at 1043–44.  
 124 Id. 
 125 Id. at 1043.  
 126 Id. at 1044.  
 127 Id. 
 128 Id. 
 129 Id. at 1046–47.  
 130 Id. at 1049 (citing Lea Deutsch, Note, Collateral Damage: Mitigating The Effects Of Foreclosure In 
Communities, 22 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 203, 207–09 (2012)) (describing community problems that 
follow in the wake of mass foreclosures including blight, increased crime, depressed property values, and 
depressed tax base); Michael A. Fletcher, A Shattered Foundation: African Americans Who Bought Homes in 
Prince George’s Have Watched Their Wealth Vanish, WASH. POST (Jan. 24, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost. 
com/sf/investigative/2015/01/24/the-americandream-shatters-in-prince-georges-county/ (citing the 2013 
Federal Reserve’s Survey of Consumer Finances) (describing a federal survey, which showed that in 2013, one 
in seven black Americans had underwater mortgages as compared to one in eighteen white homeowners). 
 131 As Atkinson notes, “[r]ecent agreements between mortgage lenders and the DOJ and CFPB to settle 
charges of unlawful discriminatory lending practices support this reality.” Atkinson, Modifying Mortgage 
Discrimination, supra note 80, at 1046–47. 
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change could help ameliorate the “perverse incentives of lenders who continue 
to target these vulnerable borrowers and vulnerable communities for predatory 
and unlawful loan products.”132 
Additionally, looking at benefits to society of another kind, the foreclosure 
crisis wiped out equity in entire neighborhoods and communities. Giving 
members of these communities another option for saving their homes could 
stabilize neighborhoods and communities in the event of another crash.133 This 
would also save taxpayers a bundle on bureaucratic programs that while 
designed to fix the program, do not work.134 
Presumably this strip down would occur by writing the principal of the loan 
down to the value of the home and then resetting the interest rate to the Till rate 
and then, presuming a debtor could finish his or her chapter 13 plan, allowing 
the debtor to pay the reduced amount at the reduced rate for the rest of the loan 
term.135 This is admittedly different than the way other debts get stripped down 
in chapter 13. Stripped down debt in chapter 13 are typically paid over the life 
of the three to five-year plan whereas, here, the loan would carry a reduced 
principal and interest rate for its entire original term which will likely last far 
longer than the plan. In this way, this solution would mirror treatment of secured 
claims in chapter 11, which are often crammed down and stretched out over the 
life of the collateral, in the case of real estate for ten, twenty years or more.  
2. Allow all Vehicles to Be Stripped Down 
Like high-cost mortgages, black Americans and Latinos take out more high-
cost auto loans.136 In addition to taking out loans with very high interest rates, 
the loans are packed with fees like yield-spread premiums,137 added “service 
contracts,” and other mark-ups.138 These types of abuses have been particularly 
concentrated in Native American communities,139 where one group of car 
 
 132 Id. at 1083.  
 133 See Hauser, supra note 113, at 226.  
 134 Id. at 227. 
 135 Id. at 235.  
 136 Id.; see also Johnson, supra note 78, at 182–84.  
 137 Hauser, supra note 113, at 208.  
 138 Id. at 183–84. 
 139 Megan Horning, Border Town Bullies: The Bad Auto Deal and Subprime Lending Problem among 
Navajo Nation Car Buyers, 73 NAT’L LAWS. GUILD J. 197–98 (2016), https://www.nlg.org/nlg-review/ 
article/border-town-bullies-the-bad-auto-deal-and-subprime-lending-problem-among-navajo-nation-car-
buyers/; see also Editor’s Preface, stating that: 
“Border Town Bullies: The Bad Auto Deal and Subprime Lending Problem among Navajo 
Nation Car Buyers” by Megan Horning examines a particularly reprehensible example of the kind 
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dealers is now being investigated by the Federal Trade Commission, which seeks 
injunctive relief, rescission or reformation of contracts, restitution, the refund of 
monies paid, disgorgement of ill-gotten funds, and other equitable relief for acts 
or practices in violation of Section 5(a) of the FTC Act, TILA and its 
implementing Regulation Z, and CLA and its implementing Regulation M.140 
Under the 2005 Amendments, the hanging paragraph forbids the strip down 
of auto loans taken out during the 910 days before the filing. No good reason for 
this change has been articulated and it appears to be a carrot to the auto finance 
industry with no further rationale.141 
For nearly all Americans, cars are important assets.142 They are typically the 
most expensive things consumers buy other than homes and Americans rely on 
them to get to work and support themselves.143 Not surprisingly then, one reason 
Americans seek bankruptcy protection is to help save their cars.144 Data from 
the Consumer Bankruptcy Project show that over eighty-five percent of chapter 
7 debtors want to use bankruptcy to keep their most valuable car and over 
seventy-five percent want to use bankruptcy to save a second car.145 Debtors are 
literally driven to bankruptcy by a motivation to save cars, particularly the large 
subset of debtors who own cars but little else and those who own negative equity 
in their cars.146 In some ways bankruptcy plays a larger role in saving cars than 
in saving homes, making the hanging paragraph’s prohibition against stripping 
down auto loans more pernicious than the prohibition from stripping down home 
loans.147  
 
of predatory lending. It explores the crushing effects predatory car loans continue to have on 
Navajo people. Horning explains the numerous social, cultural, economic, and geographical 
factors that combine to make the Navajo community uniquely susceptible to the profit-
maximizing machinations of car dealerships. It comprehensively maps out the fraud, trickery, and 
coercion used against borrowers for whom a car is a necessity due to the remote and sparsely 
populated region in which they live. After diagnosing the problem, Horning goes on to suggest a 
list of remedies that might help protect the Navajo from continued exploitation.  
Editor’s Preface to Winter 2016 Edition, available at https://www.nlg.org/nlg-review/article/editors-preface-
winter-2016/. 
 140 FTC v. Tate’s Auto Ctr. of Winslow Incorporation, No. CV-18-08176-PCT-DJH, 2019 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 39477 (D. Ariz. Mar. 12, 2019).  
 141 David Gray Carlson, Cars in Chapter 13: Does Negative Equity Destroy the Jurisdiction of the 
Hanging Paragraph? 20 AM. BANK. L. REV. 535, 536 (2012). 
 142 Pamela Foohey et al., Driven to Bankruptcy, 55 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 2–5 (2020) (forthcoming).  
 143 Id. at 2. 
 144 Id. at 21. 
 145 Id. at 35. 
 146 Id.  
 147 Id. at 37–39. 
MARTIN_7.15.20 7/15/2020 3:00 PM 
2020] BRINGING RELEVANCE BACK 605 
Once again, black American debtors are more likely than white debtors to 
be driven to file bankruptcy to save cars.148 They are also more likely to have 
high-interest auto loans, and stripping down those interest rates in chapter 13 
could be disproportionately more valuable for these often predatory loans.149 
While bankruptcy cannot close racial disparities in car prices, auto loan interest 
rates, and repossession rates, it can help close these gaps by making strip down 
more available for all filers.150 Thus, repealing the hanging paragraph could go 
a long way toward making consumer bankruptcy more relevant and more 
racially neutral as well.  
B. Allow the Discharge of All Student Loans and Particularly Private Student 
Loans 
A big step toward making consumer bankruptcy more relevant to the needs 
of the people is to reconsider the treatment of student loans in the bankruptcy 
system.151 While this is particularly important for leveling the economic playing 
field for people of color, who on average, pay higher interest rates on student 
loans and receive lower quality educations, the issue is important to all 
Americans given the size of the current student loan debt. High educational debts 
with low value can literally cause poverty, rather than alleviating poverty as 
much student loan debt might.152 
 
 148 Id. 
 149 Id.  
 150 Id. at 39. 
 151 Daniel A. Austin, The Indentured Generation: Bankruptcy and Student Loan Debt, 53 SANTA CLARA 
L. REV. 329, 336 (2013); Abbye Atkinson, Race, Educational Loans, and Bankruptcy, 16 MICH. J. RACE & L. 1, 
31–40 [hereinafter Atkinson, Race, Educational Loans, and Bankruptcy] (explaining that removing student loans 
from the list of nondischargeable debts, going back to the time-lapse strategy of discharging student loan debt, 
having Congress define “undue hardship” or making college more affordable).  
 152 This issue is of local as well as national interest to me. According to the New Mexico Center on Law 
and Poverty: 
New Mexico has the second highest rate of default on student loan debt in the country. Recent 
research has shown that student loan servicing companies have systemically steered borrowers 
away from the affordable repayment plans they have the right to under federal law, often leaving 
borrowers in even greater debt and contributing to high rates of defaults.  
One potential solution for New Mexico borrowers that came up at the Fall convening and in 
conversations since is developing outreach and know your rights trainings for student borrowers 
around our state. Because there aren’t a whole lot a resources to help student loan borrowers 
troubleshoot and navigate their repayment options, we wanted to pull everyone together to discuss 
the ways that we can collaborate to provide trainings for borrowers around New Mexico.  
Email from Lindsay Cutler, staff attorney for New Mexico Center for Law and Poverty (Dec. 17, 2019). Id. 
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1. The Debt is Huge and the Percentage of Income Going to Student Loans 
is Even Larger for Persons of Color 
Minorities pay more for student loans and have more student loan debt.153 
These higher debt rates resulted in part from differences in wealth, family 
background, postsecondary educational differences, and family contributions to 
college among black and white students, but this does not explain the entire 
disparity. Young adults’ net worth explains a portion of the black-white disparity 
in debt, suggesting that both differences in accumulation of debt and ability to 
repay debt in young adulthood explain racial disparities in debt, but also that the 
black-white disparity was greatest at the highest levels of parents’ net worth. 
Somehow, the black students were not insulated by their parents’ wealth, even 
when that wealth was equal to the wealth of the white students.154 Thus, a larger 
than proportionate share of the increasing costs of a higher education is being 
carried by black students.155 This reinforces existing social stratification and 
allows racial economic disparities to be inherited across generations.156  
A survey of consumer finances similarly found that racial inequalities were 
more prevalent for student loans than any other debt and that this growth in debt 
was not attributable to differences in educational attainment across racial 
groups.157 Rather, it resulted from “predatory inclusion” in which lenders 
offered exploitive loans that limited or eliminate the long-term benefits of 
getting the education in the first place.158  
 
 153 Atkinson, supra note 151, at 24–31. Atkinson discusses how student loan debt can be particularly 
harmful to black Americans because black Americans are more likely to borrow money for school, have less 
family resources, and are given worse credit terms. Id.; see also Fenaba R. Addo, Jason N. Houle & Daniel 
Simon, Young, Black, and (Still) in the Red: Parental Wealth, Race, and Student Loan Debt, 8 RACE AND SOCIAL 
PROBLEMS 64 (2016). Atkinson also explains that since student loan debt has a disproportionately harmful impact 
on black Americans, educational achievement alone is not enough to justify the special protection student loans 
are given in the bankruptcy system. Atkinson, supra note 151, at 26–28. 
 154 Id. 
 155 Richard Fry et al., Young Adults, Student Debt, and Economic Well-being, PEW RESEARCH CTR. 19–
20 (2014), https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2014/05/ST_2014.05.14_student-debt_ 
complete-report.pdf. 
 156 Id. 
 157 Louise Seamster & Raphaël Charron-Chénier, Predatory Inclusion and Education Debt: Rethinking 
the Racial Wealth Gap, 4 SOC. CURRENTS 199, 6–7 (2017). 
 158 Id. at 2. Similarly, Scott-Clayton and Li found that after earning their bachelor’s degrees, black college 
graduates owe $7,400 more on average than their white peers. Judith Scott-Clayton & Jing Li, Black-White 
Disparity in Student Loan Debt More Than Triples After Graduation (2016), https://vtechworks.lib.vt.edu/ 
bitstream/handle/10919/83265/BlackWhiteDisparity.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y. Black students owe an 
average of $23,400 compared to $16,000 for white students. After a few years, the black-white debt gap more 
than triples to over $25,000. Differences in interest accrual and graduate school borrowing lead to black 
graduates holding nearly $53,000 in student loan debt four years after graduation, which is nearly twice as much 
as their white counterparts. These data show far greater debt gaps than previous research.  
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While there is debate about whether the massive student loan debt in 
America could create another financial crisis,159 no one denies that this debt is 
as large as it has ever been.160 It is the second largest amount of consumer debt 
in the U.S. economy after mortgages.161 Student loan debt has grown more than 
any other category of consumer spending, at three times the rate of inflation.162 
In 2011, 37 million Americans owed a total of one trillion163 and by 2019, this 
amount had risen to $1.6 trillion.164 Calling this generation the indentured 
generation, one scholar notes that tuition ballooned from twenty-three percent 
of annual earnings in 2001 to thirty-eight percent of annual earnings in 2010.165 
As of 2019, this percentage is no doubt even higher. 166  
 
 159 See Jonathan D. Glater, Student Debt and the Siren Song of Systemic Risk, 53 HARV. J. ON LEG. 99 
(2016) (arguing against a bubble); but see also NAT’L ASS’N OF CONSUMER BANKR. ATT’YS, STUDENT LOAN 
DEBT CRISES SURVEY (2012), http://nacba.org/Portals /0/Documents/Student%20Loan%20Debt/020712% 
20NACBA%20ststude%20loa n%20survey.pdf (finding that eighty-one percent of consumer bankruptcy 
attorneys say that clients with student loan debt have increased noticeably within the past four years, and that 
the effective lack of bankruptcy discharge for these debts prevents debtors from obtaining a financial fresh start); 
Daniel Wagner, CFPB: Private Student Loans Parallel Subprime Mortgage Lending, HUFF. POST (July 20, 
2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/07/20/cfpb-private-student-loans-subprimemortgage_n_1688771. 
html (stating that private student loan lenders gave loans without regard to whether students could pay, then 
bundled and resold the loans, though federal government loans are not underwritten). 
 160 Austin, supra note 151, at 336. 
 161 Clifford, Robert, Student-Loan Debt, Delinquency, and Default: A New England Perspective (Sept. 1, 
2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3031192. In 2009, student-loan debt became the largest non-housing-related 
consumer debt in the United States. By 2013, outstanding student debt balances had grown to exceed $1 trillion, 
and by the end of 2015, had reached $1.23 trillion.  
 162 Austin, supra note 151, at 336. Austin’s article about the student loan crisis deals with a national debt 
crisis that has been covered extensively by news outlets. It builds upon the work of Professor Rafael Pardo and 
notes that student loan debt has now outgrown all other forms of consumer debt and that an education is the most 
expensive thing most of us will purchase other than a house. He includes provides a detailed description of how 
the Bankruptcy Code treats student loan debt, concluding that such debt is generally non-dischargeable despite 
that most other non-dischargeable debt involves either debt resulting from a nefarious act like fraud or driving 
drunk, or is deeply needed for survival by the recipient, such as child support. He makes a strong case that 
making student loan debt non-dischargeable is an outlier, in the sense that it neither results from a terrible act, 
nor is that critical to the recipient. Id. 
 163 Austin, supra note 151, at 330. 
 164 Ellen Paris, Student Loan Debt Still Impacting Millennial Homebuyers, FORBES (Mar. 31, 2019), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/ellenparis/2019/03/31/student-loan-debt-still-impacting-millennial-homebuyers/ 
#4233ecac3e78.  
 165 Austin, supra note 151, at 357. 
 166 See Alison Doyle, Average Salary Information for US Workers, THE BALANCE CAREERS (May 10, 
2019), https://www.thebalancecareers.com/average-salary-information-for-us-workers-2060808 (last visited 
Feb. 6, 2020); The median wage in the United States in the first quarter of 2019 was $47,060. Id. Jaleesa 
Bustamante, Average Cost of College & Tuition, EDUCATIONDATA.ORG (June 7, 2019), https://educationdata. 
org/average-cost-of-college/ (last visited Feb. 6, 2020). For the 2018–2019 academic year, the average cost of a 
public college is $10,230 and the average cost of a private college is $35,839, seemingly showing that the cost 
of public college was approximately twenty-two percent of annual earnings and the cost of private college was 
approximately seventy-six percent of annual earnings. Id.  
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While these increases have resulted in more students gaining access to higher 
education, which would seem to benefit persons of color in particular, wages for 
that group have been even flatter than for other Americans, making tuition an 
even larger percentage of annual earnings for those groups.167 Moreover, a large 
part of the increased access has been access to low-value educations, 
characterized by higher tuition, lower graduation rates, and even lower job 
placements rates.168 Low graduation rates create the ultimate no-value student 
loans––those students must pay despite little access to a better life.169  
While for-profit universities and colleges are to blame for some of the 
increases in tuition costs and student loan debt, for-profit universities are by no 
means alone in increasing tuition costs.170 These increases in tuition costs may 
be fueled by the increase in availability of student loans,171 a theory known as 
the Bennett Principle after President Reagan’s Secretary of Education, William 
J. Bennett.172 Bennett wrote a scathing New York Times op-ed accusing colleges 
of greedily raising tuition, confident that Federal Loan subsidies would expand 
to make up the difference.173 The availability of student loan credit has spurred 
building booms at colleges across the nation, for which current and future 
students pay.174 Additionally, high student loan debt and persistently low wages 
likely discourage students from taking jobs as teachers or in other public service 
jobs.175 
Making more student loans available was originally thought to have the 
capacity to create parity among different socio-economic groups. In reality, this 
increase in credit availability and the concurrent increase in tuition has had the 
exact opposite effect.176 The growth in federal student loan programs and bloated 
college costs has led to a growth in socio-economic disparity between races, 
classes, and ethnic groups.177  
 
 167 Usual Weekly Earnings of Wage and Salary Workers Fourth Quarter 2019, BUREAU OF LABOR 
STATISTICS U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR (2020), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/wkyeng.pdf. 
 168 Austin, supra note 151, at 336.  
 169 Id. at 335–36.  
 170 Id. at 405–06. 
 171 Glater, supra note 159, at 112; Austin, supra note 151, at 346. 
 172 Glater, supra note 159, at 112. 
 173 Id. 
 174 Austin, supra note 151, at 345–46. 
 175 Id. at 402–403. 
 176 Id. at 346. 
 177 Id. at 346 n.128. 
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2. Special Problems for Students For-Profit Universities 
The largest and fastest growth in student loans is for students at for-profit 
schools, even though students at these schools have a lower graduation rate, 
higher debt, and higher tendency to default on loans.178 Similar to payday and 
title loans and subprime mortgages, some of this debt is low-value debt, meaning 
that the education results in little increase in future income.179 There is no doubt 
that the Bennett Principle has resulted in far more for-profit colleges and thus 
far more no-value and low-value educations. The schools are expensive for the 
value they provide and virtually all of the students at these schools take out 
student loans compared to a fraction at other colleges and universities.180 They 
are also attended by higher percentages of students of color.  
3. How to Pay When the Time Comes 
For all student loans, when it comes time to pay them, student have choices. 
Unfortunately, none are very good choices. One choice is to pay as originally 
indicated. Another is to enter into one of many income-based repayment plans, 
which can result in zero payment for at least a while. Another choice is to take 
a public service job, pay as indicated or under an income-based plan for five or 
ten years and then get the debt forgiven. Yet another, a choice of last resort for 
most, is to file for bankruptcy and try to discharge the debts. Considering the 
non-bankruptcy options first, paying as indicated can be hard to say the least. 
Daniel Austin provides some examples of astronomically high average debt.181 
Income-based repayment plans can be handy at the time and can get a borrower 
through hard times, but they lead to future hard times as the debt continues to 
earn interest and mushroom.182 
 
 178 Id. at 335 (citing STANDARD & POOR’S, US Student Loan ABS Issuances Ticking Up, But the Future Is 
Uncertain Say Conference Speakers 2 (2012), http://www.standardandpoors.com/spf/upload/Events_US/ 
US_SF_Event_619abs 10.pdf); Chris Kirkham, For-Profit College Students Face Higher Debt, More 
Unemployment, Report Finds, HUFF. POST (Jan. 4, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/01/03/for-
profit-colleges-unemploymentdebt_n_1182164.html. 
 179 There are many ways some of this debt has become no value or low value debt because educational 
opportunities have been extent expanded greatly, including expanding no-value and low-value education. No-
value and low-value education is provided primarily by for-profit universities that charge high tuition for degrees 
that result in low pay and low job placement.  
 180 Austin, supra note 151, at 405–06. 
 181 Before entering academia, I paid my own debts off from September of 1986 to 1996, ten years to the 
month from my first payment. I worked at a large private law firm and also had the support of a debt-free spouse. 
My debts were also a fraction of the debts of those graduating today.  
 182 34 C.F.R. §§ 685.204(a)(1), (h), 682.210(a)(1), (8) (2014).  
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A few student loan forgiveness programs seem to work well,183 but most are 
turning into unfulfilled promises. In 2008, the Obama Administration started a 
program through which professionals could work at public interest jobs for ten 
years and then be forgiven for the rest of their student debt. As of September 
2018, 28,000 borrowers submitted their applications to have their student loan 
debts forgiven.184 However, only ninety-six applications were approved, less 
than a half of one percent.185 Borrowers have been unable to communicate with 
FedLoan Servicing because FedLoan Servicing itself is confused about the exact 
requirements of the Public Service Loan Forgiveness program.186  
In 2016, four attorneys and the American Bar Association (ABA) sued the 
Department of Education because they believed the Department of Education 
changed the terms of the Public Service Loan Forgiveness program.187 
According to the ABA, the ABA itself was considered a public service job prior 
to the new regulations, but the Department of Education changed its 
interpretation in 2016.188 The program seems to have been changed not just for 
new applicants but for those who had already applied and been accepted.189 In 
February 2019, U.S. District Judge Timothy Kelly ruled that the Department of 
Education acted arbitrarily and capriciously when it changed its interpretation 
of the Public Service Loan Forgiveness regulation.190 In other words, the 
Department of Education is not voluntarily complying with loan forgiveness 
programs.  
4. History and Rationale Behind the Nondischargeability of Student Loans 
Moving on to the bankruptcy options, these options are not relevant for many 
consumers. These options have also been chipped away over the years with little 
evidence of any need to do so. Prior to the enactment of the modern Bankruptcy 
Code in 1978, student loans were dischargeable in bankruptcy and thus treated 
 
 183 See Austin, supra note 151, 347–51. 
 184 Stacey Cowley, 28,000 Public Servants Sought Student Loan Forgiveness. 96 Got It, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/27/business/student-loan-forgiveness.html.  
 185 Id.  
 186 Id.  
 187 ABA v. United States Dep’t of Educ., 370 F. Supp. 3d 1, 10 (D.D.C. 2019). 
 188 Debra Cassens Weiss, In About-face, Several ABA Employees Are Told They Qualify for Public Service 
Loan Forgiveness, ABA JOURNAL (Aug. 27, 2019), https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/in-about-face-
several-aba-employees-are-told-they-qualify-for-public-service-loan-forgiveness (last visited on Dec. 2, 
2019).  
 189 Id. For example, some of the attorneys who had already been told they would qualify began receiving 
notices that year that they no longer qualified for the program. 
 190 ABA, 370 F. Supp. 3d at 10.  
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no differently than other unsecured debt.191 When the 1978 Code was enacted, 
student loans were only dischargeable in bankruptcy under two conditions.192 
First, if the loans originated before five years before the bankruptcy filing, they 
were discharged. Second, the loan could be discharged after a court hearing if 
the debtor could prove that the “student loan would impose an undue hardship 
on the debtor and the debtor’s dependents . . . .”193 Courts and commentators 
have struggled for years over the meaning of this amorphous phrase and while 
results vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, all agree that getting an undue 
hardship discharge is difficult enough that few bankruptcy debtors bother 
trying.194 This is true despite an obvious inability to pay these debts in many 
cases.195 
The original rationale for making student loans not dischargeable in 1978 
was that lenders were lending to borrowers without underwriting, meaning 
without determining the borrowers’ ability to pay, so they were taking on 
additional risk.196 Moreover, as a society, we needed to ensure a steady stream 
of future funds for future student borrowers.197 Third, there was a fear that 
students would knowingly take on the debt and then plan to discharge it later in 
bankruptcy, a form of moral hazard. Finally, because students voluntarily took 
on the debt, there was a feeling that they should pay it no matter what, rather 
than shifting the loss to the creditor.198 We will look at these rationales again, 
but these last two clearly apply to any debt.  
From this original treatment of student loans in the 1978 Code, Congress has 
tightened the standard bit by bit, all while extending the nondischargeability of 
student loans to more and more lenders.199 With no evidence suggesting abuse 
 
 191 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (1978). 
 192 Ryan Freeman, Comment, Student-Loan Discharge—An Empirical Study of the Undue Hardship 
Provision of § 523(A)(8) Under Appellate Review 30 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 147, 150 (2013); 11 U.S.C. 
§ 523(a)(8). 
 193 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8); see also Austin, supra note 151, at 376 (citing Rafael Pardo & Michelle Lacey, 
The Real Student-Loan Scandal: Undue Hardship Discharge Litigation 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 180, 185–90 
(2009)).  
 194 Austin, supra note 151, at 338–400. There are numerous studies showing that it is hard to discharge 
student loan debt under the undue hardship test. See id. (citing Pardo & Lacey, supra note 193, at 205). One 
study shows the likely of discharge by federal appellate court, and also shows that the presence of a medical 
condition can improve chances. Freeman, supra note 192, at 181. It also shows that a debtor has a better chance 
of success if he or she is pro se. Id.  
 195 Austin, supra note 151, at 400 (citing Pardo & Lacey, supra note 193 at 479–86). 
 196 Austin, supra note 151, at 368. 
 197 Id. at 369; Atkinson, supra note 151, at 22. 
 198 Austin, supra note 151, at 369–370. 
 199 Freeman, supra note 192, at 150 n.11, 155; 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8); Pardo & Lacey, supra note 193, at 
180–81. 
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on the part of debtors wishing to discharge student loans, in 1990, Congress 
extended the five-year period for discharging a student loan without undue 
hardship, to seven years.200 Again with no evidence of abuse, Congress in 1998 
eliminated the seven-year option entirely, leaving only “undue hardship” as 
grounds to discharge a student loan.201 Finally, in 2005, in connection with The 
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA),202 
Congress handed private student loan lenders, which generally charge higher 
interest than the federal government even though they do underwrite loans, a 
huge carrot. Unlike all other private lenders, these lenders now get the same 
protections as Federal Loan providers, namely nondischargeabilty.203  
5. Unjustified Special Treatment for Private Student Loans 
The justification for not discharging private student loans was that this would 
reduce the cost of these private loans and make these loans more affordable and 
available to more people, including people who would otherwise have difficulty 
getting credit such as students from communities of color.204 As it turns out, the 
theory that making private student loans nondischargeable would reduce their 
costs turned out to be untrue. The loans have not decreased in cost,205 nor are 
borrowers particularly sensitive to incremental price differentials at the time they 
take out these loans.206 Moreover, the loans themselves are not subject to interest 
rate caps, and are thus much more expensive than federal student loans.207 Some 
carry interest rates of fifteen percent or more and some even carry adjustable 
interest rates. They often offer no deferments, income-contingent repayment 
plans, or any of the other relief provided for federal loans.208 Like subprime 
mortgage loans,209 more than half of the students who take out these loans do so 
before maxing out on cheaper federal loans.210  
 
 200 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8). 
 201 Freeman, supra note 192, at 155. Perhaps this is obvious, but the debtor has to prove undue hardship. 
Pardo & Lacey, supra note 193, at 185–90. This proof is hard to accomplish and the substance and the procedure 
undermines the fresh start. The resulting burden on courts has also been significant. Moreover, many debtors do 
not bother trying.  
 202 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, §418, 199 
Stat. 23 (2005). 
 203 Alexei Alexandrov & Dalié Jiménez, Lessons from Bankruptcy Reform in the Private Student Loan 
Market, 11 HARV. L. & P’LY REV. 177, 180–81. 
 204 Id. at 178. 
 205 Id. at 202–06. 
 206 Id. at 206–08. 
 207 Austin, supra note 151, at 343. 
 208 Id.  
 209 Bar-Gill & Warren, Making Credit Safer, supra note 55, at 32.  
 210 Austin, supra note 151, at 344. 
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Despite all of these unfavorable (for students) terms, we are now we are left 
with remarkable protection for private student loans. These lenders enjoy 
protection no other private lenders enjoy, including mortgage lenders, whose 
deficiencies still get discharged. All other unsecured creditors get their loans 
discharged regardless of how the loans are incurred. This is the primary function 
of consumer bankruptcy and the mechanism for providing the fresh start. 211 
6. Rationale for Reversal of Student Loan Nondischargeability 
The outlier treatment for private student loan lenders described above was a 
net loss for students and an unjustifiable net gain for one sector of the private 
lending community. Since people of color take out more expensive private loans 
than others, the loss gain falls on them, further perpetuating the debt gap between 
them and other Americans, which in turn furthers the income and wealth gap.212 
As explained by Jimenez and Alexandrov:  
[p]oor and minority students are disproportionately affected by our 
system of student loans. Minority students are more likely to enroll in 
for-profit schools, borrow more than their white counterparts for the 
same degrees, more likely to fail to graduate, and more likely to default 
on student loans in general . . . while white college graduates seem to 
enjoy an “economic cushion” from their college education, African 
American college graduates do not. Unlike their white counterparts, 
‘African American college graduates are equally likely to file for 
bankruptcy as African Americans without a college diploma.’ Most 
recently, researchers at the Brookings Institution found that [f]our 
years after graduation, black graduates have nearly $25,000 more 
student loan debt than white graduates: $52,726 on average, compared 
to $28,006 for the typical white graduate.213 
As Professor Abbye Atkinson explains in Race, Educational Loans, and 
Bankruptcy, black students may be more significantly affected by student loan 
nondischargeability than white students due to the costliness of their loans, lower 
wages post-education, fewer family resources to support educational cost, and a 
likelihood of more legal and other dependents to support.214 Professor 
Atkinson’s work is unique in that it comes from the 2007 Consumer Bankruptcy 
Project dataset.215 These data also show that higher education acts as a buffer to 
financial distress in white students but not necessarily for black students, perhaps 
 
 211 Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 287 (1991).  
 212 Seamster & Charron-Chénier, supra note 157, at 6–7.  
 213 Alexandrov & Jiminez, supra note 203, at 181–82 (internal quotations omitted).  
 214 Atkinson, supra note 151, at 26–29. 
 215 Alexandrov & Jiminez, supra note 203, at 181–82. 
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because of the relatively high cost of this credit, among the other factors noted 
above.216 Whatever the reason, forbidding the discharge of student loans 
disproportionately harms persons of color. 
If all of this were not enough, private student loan lenders also now use 
fintech companies (online financial technology firms), to screen borrowers for 
various types of consumer loans and connect them with third-party lenders.217 
These new technologies exacerbate racial inequalities in credit. Rather than 
relying entirely on FICO scores to assess creditworthiness, fintech companies 
use artificial intelligence algorithms that study “where borrowers live, what 
clubs they belong to, their text messaging habits, their health records, and even 
their social media activity.”218 Fintech companies also use more traditional data 
like transcripts, standardized test scores, college majors, the prestige of their 
degree, parents’ level of educational attainment, whether a student worked 
during high school, and the number of colleges a student visited with a parent.219  
While this sounds promising given that it is harmful to lend to people who 
cannot repay,220 the on-the-ground applications of these data points are more 
pernicious. While the companies claim their goal is to “include those who have 
been left out of the financial space in innovative, profitable ways,”221 many of 
these innovative data points reinforce “preexisting income, class, racial, and 
ethnic barriers in the credit economy, as well as produce effective discrimination 
toward legally protected classes.”222 
However, reform is justified for all student loans, not just private ones. High 
student loan balances limit people’s access to the credit economy.223 For those 
who do get credit, those with defaults on student loans will pay more for the 
credit they do get.224 Excessive debt also causes adverse health outcomes,225 
 
 216 Atkinson, supra note 151, at 2–3. 
 217 This is highly simplified. For a more sophisticated description, see Christopher K. Odinet, The New 
Data of Student Debt, 92 S. CAL. L. REV. 1617, 1635–40 (2019). 
 218 Id. at 1645. According to one credit it industry executive, “how many times a person says ‘wasted’ in 
their [social media] profile . . . has some value in predicting whether they’re going to repay their debt . . . .” Id. 
at 1645. 
 219 Id. at 1645 n.214. 
 220 Alexandrov & Jiminez, supra note 203, at 212–13 (recommending underwriting for private student 
loans). 
 221 Odinet, supra note 217, at 1651.  
 222 Odinet, supra note 217, at 1621; Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due 
Process for Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1, 13 (2014). 
 223 Austin, supra note 151, at 331.  
 224 Id. at 406.  
 225 Id. at 333, 400–02. 
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which cost the public more in increased insurance costs and health care for the 
indigent. These problems affect entire families226 and society as a whole.227 
Additionally, the CFPB was at one time very active in policing bad student loan 
providers. Since the CFPB no longer monitors these providers, discharge of 
student loans is even more justified.  
7. Some Law Student Thoughts on Student Loan Dischargeability 
Admittedly, the quotes below do not come from rigorous empirical research 
nor are they random. They were generated from my Fall 2019 bankruptcy exam, 
on which I offered extra credit to those who wished to weigh in on the pros and 
cons on discharging student loans in bankruptcy. I did not cover this topic in 
detail in class nor did I express any particular opinion on the subject. Most 
students understood that allowing student loan debt to be discharged would 
allow students to shirk responsibility and perhaps make a bankruptcy discharge 
too common and easy for the common good. Most, though, felt that times were 
sufficiently different today than a decade ago, expressing these types of 
sentiments: 
Discharging student loan debt in bankruptcy would allow graduates 
who are either under-employed or unemployed to free themselves of 
financial obligations that are otherwise not allowing them to live 
freely. In other words, allowing them to spend money on things like 
real property or consumer goods that they cannot otherwise buy. From 
a broader policy view, disallowing discharge of student loan debt may 
have a chilling effect on individuals who would otherwise seek a post-
secondary education, but cannot afford the price tag.  
Letting individuals discharge student loan debt in bankruptcy may 
increase the number of applicants and graduates, and then increase the 
overall skilled workforce. More skilled workers means more people 
with money to spend, which means a healthier economy.  
Crippling student debt is holding a whole generation down from 
having financial flexibility and spending. In the long run, it hurts the 
economy and society because there is no way it will be paid back in 
full. We are missing out on a lot because people have to get paid well 
right away with hopes of paying back the loans.  
College has become stinking expensive and the job market is not all it 
used to be. These debts are causing significant burdens for some 
 
 226 Id. at 337–38. 
 227 Id. at 399. 
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people. On a societal level, this huge debt is a serious weight on our 
national economy.  
So many colleges have moved to an essentially profit model. Most 
state schools, while carrying the name of the state, receive little or no 
funding. Thus, tuition and fees have been steadily increasing and the 
burden on students grows. While the preclusion on discharge made 
sense historically, with the current state of college tuition and 
expenses, the debt should now be dischargeable. 
The whole purpose of chapter 7 is to give debtors a fresh start. If the 
debtor has thousands of dollars of nondischargeable student loan debt, 
it takes away the main benefit of chapter 7. The debtor is still in debt, 
and is still going to struggle to pay back the loans. Also, the undue 
hardship test seems allows judges to make decisions based on values 
and not the law. I understand the purpose of the test. If people can pay 
back their loans they probably should, but the actual implementation 
of the test seems to come down to the judge’s values and morals as we 
saw in Educational Credit Management Corp. vs. Jespersen where the 
Court made judgments about whether the debtor should keep living in 
his brother’s basement and whether he should be allowed to buy 
cigarettes. If student loans are not fully dischargeable, maybe they 
could be partially dischargeable, or at the very least courts need a 
better test to determine dischargeability. 
A couple of students suggested middle grounds: 
I believe that student debt to the extent of payment of the education, 
including books and required schooling items like a laptop and 
reasonable living expenses, should be discharged. I didn’t know 
people who take out large loans so they are able to live lavishly. This 
was mostly at colleges like USC, UCLA, or CU where image is 
everything. Those expenses I would not discharge.  
I believe that the debt should be stripped down to the equivalent of the 
value of the degree and the future earning potential it represents. 
Universities and colleges in the United States charge large amounts for 
the same education that is offered at lower prices. Also, universities 
need more money to educate students about the loans. Allowing a 
discharge of student loans from universities where the degree is never 
going to make a person enough money to support themselves causes 
people to go through hardships and makes not just individuals suffer 
but the overall economy as well. When I was looking for a law school 
I was told that unless you were getting into the top five, go to the 
cheapest one because you’re going to get the same education and you 
shouldn’t pay more if you do not have to. 
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And one student, who presumably knows nothing about the history of student 
loan dischargeability, suggested that, like the old adage, what is old is new again: 
I feel that there should be a middle ground where people have to show 
that they made a real effort to not fall behind on their student loans 
over a period of time, maybe five years, and then after that point, if it 
is shown that they made an effort to eliminate the loans, the loans 
should be discharged at that point. 
8. How to Amend the Code to Address the Student Loan Issue 
There are many ways the Bankruptcy Code could be amended to address 
these issues. Austin suggests we reevaluate the fair market value of the student 
loan, and do a student loan cram down or strip down of sorts.228 Alexandrov and 
Jiménez suggest either a roll-back to the old dischargeability rules or a court-
applied underwriting standard.229 While these are both excellent suggestions, 
they seem like a lot of work for courts with little reward. I would recommend 
returning to the rule in which the student loans also are dischargeable after seven 
years or upon a showing of undue hardship.  
The way to address the for-profit contribution to this problem with the finest 
point would be to limit the supply side of these educations, by limiting access to 
federal student loans for for-profit universities that cannot prove value to 
students though job placement and other indicators. This would be easy to 
accomplish because these schools get the vast majority of their funding from 
student loans. Almost no one goes to these institutions who can afford to pay. 
While the process of doing this began under Obama and the CFPB, the current 
administration likely has little appetite for this supply-side correction.230 An 
overall standard that allowed discharge would work for these loans as well. 
 
 228 Id. at 414.  
 229 Alexandrov & Jiminez, supra note 203, at 221–22. They suggest: 
borrowing from the Dodd-Frank Act and subsequent CFPB mortgage regulations, we suggest that 
a lender should incur liability if it did not verify the student’s potential to repay the loan by 
comparing the loan amount with the student’s choice of school and major’s expected graduation 
rates and earnings post-graduation (if student even graduates) . . . [and creating] safe harbors for 
the ease of administrability: high graduation rates at the school that student chose, high salaries 
after graduating with a given major from this particular school, and an income-based repayment 
plan . . . . 
 230 Erik Ortiz, Trump University Lawsuit Will Go to Trial, NY Judge Rules, NBC NEWS (Apr. 26, 2016), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2016-election/trump-university-lawsuit-will-go-trial-ny-judge-rules-
n562816 (last visited on Mar. 23, 2020). Because Trump had his own for-profit university, he is not as 
enthusiastic about regulating them as other presidents might.  
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III. DEFINING OURSELVES THROUGH OUR BANKRUPTCY SYSTEM 
This section asks what we might do, now that we have so much income, 
wealth, and debt inequality in our society, recognizing that the situation is 
harmful for all of us but particularly for individuals and communities of color, 
who pay more for credit and have worse outcomes in bankruptcy.231 Are we 
motivated to use the bankruptcy system to attempt to solve some of these 
problems, and if so how? If not, why not? Our answers reflect the kind of society 
we wish to be or to become, now that so much in the world of consumer credit 
has changed. The sections above provide some justification for the two major 
changes suggested. Here we consider some broader societal issues and in light 
of them, suggest a third amendment.  
One principal common to all commercial law is that the systems are not 
punitive. Rather, it is all about the money. We do not to take from one party 
economically without benefitting another. For example, bankruptcy trustees and 
executing creditors do not routinely take possession of a debtor’s assets unless 
doing so will generate a return for creditors. To do so would harm the debtor 
without helping anyone else.  
With regard to home mortgages, Professor Levitin has shown that lenders 
actually incur greater losses on a greater percentage of mortgages in foreclosure 
than they would in a chapter 13 strip down and also that that mortgage markets 
are indifferent to strip down risk because the number of mortgages that could be 
modified at any given time is small in magnitude compared to the overall loans 
in the system.232 Student loan markets similarly appear mostly insensitive to 
bankruptcy discharge.233 If lenders are not underwriting for bankruptcy risks like 
strip down and discharge, they are not financially weighing these concerns, 
meaning they do not consider these risks to be significant. For the same reason 
that a trustee cannot take a debtor’s used clothes, even though the trustee might 
be entitled to them, these lenders should not be able to injure debtors without 
significantly helping themselves. We should not protect banks from strip down 
when they have chosen not to protect themselves from bad loans. The same is 
true of private student loan lenders.  
Bankruptcy is for the honest but unfortunate debtor.234 Some assistance to 
the debtor is always contemplated and this benefits society too. This assistance 
 
 231 Rory Van Loo, A Tale of Two Bankruptcy Debtors, 72 ALB. L. REV. 231, 233 (2009). 
 232 Levitin, Resolving the Foreclosure Crisis, supra note 89, at 611. 
 233 Alexandrov & Jiminez, supra note 203, at 220–28.  
 234 Local Loan v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1923). 
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is the basis of the fresh start. Conversely, a person trapped in perpetual 
insolvency is a burden to both him or herself and society as well.235 Generally 
speaking, forgiving debts is better for society than allowing a cycle of 
impoverishment to continue. As the First Circuit explained in 2015: “Our 
nation’s bankruptcy system was built on the principle that sometimes, honest 
people fall on hard times. While the bankruptcy code has naturally gone through 
revisions and updates since its inception, that foundational philosophy has 
always laid at its root.”236 
Our debtor-creditor laws, including exemption laws but others as well, 
demonstrate a clear public policy that “exemption from personal pauperism is of 
greater concern than the rights of creditors.”237 Indeed, the “very purpose” of the 
Bankruptcy Code “is to protect debtors from pauperism.”238 In other words, 
bankruptcy law is here to help, which it does for two broad categories of policy 
reasons. First, these laws return debtors to productive economic participation, so 
they can earn wages, support themselves, pay taxes, and fuel the economy by 
buying things.239 Second, the system is here to soften financial blows and be 
kind. While this second reason is sometimes described in terms of providing 
social insurance,240 and at other times as humanitarian assistance worthy of a 
civilized society,241 many courts and scholars embrace the idea that forgiving 
debts builds character, is virtuous, and thus helps build a just society.242 In other 
words, to forgive debts is humane and human.243 
While sometimes stated as a third theory, utilitarianism supports both 
economic and humanitarian reasons for bankruptcy relief, as both individuals 
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and societies benefit from providing broad bankruptcy relief.244 Stated in the 
negative, financial problems cause endless forms of human agony and indignity, 
including shame, embarrassment, guilt,245 poor health, depression, hopelessness, 
loneliness, marital difficulties, mentally ill and scared children, difficulty 
concentrating at work, and so on. As Professor Michael Sousa recounts: 
Children of financially stressed parents tend to be more prone to 
mental health problems, depression, loneliness, and are more 
emotionally sensitive. They are less sociable, and more distrustful, and 
are more likely to feel excluded by their peers, especially if they are 
girls. Boys of financially stressed parents are likely to exhibit low self-
esteem, to show behaviour problems in school, and be susceptible to 
negative peer pressure and alcohol and drug problems. Financial stress 
is related to poorer academic performance in both boys and girls.246 
Education and home ownership on the other hand, are associated with supportive 
outcomes for individuals, families, and society as a whole.247 These facts make 
it hard to deny that broader consumer bankruptcy laws, particularly those that 
support education and home ownership, make for a better society.  
One of the negative outcomes of indebtedness is shame. Shame is 
particularly harmful, individually and collectively.248 The shame of excessive 
debt is exacerbated for those who come from disadvantaged groups and who 
perhaps feel as if they have no right to credit, however bad, in the first place.249 
Thus, reducing bankruptcy shame could help level the playing field for 
disenfranchised groups, who bear more of the burden of bad credit, and more of 
the shame burden as well.250 Reducing shame could also help every bankruptcy 
 
 244 Id. at 600–01. 
 245 Pamela Foohey, Debt’s Emotional Encumbrances, in EDWARD EDGAR RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON LAW 
AND EMOTION 7–8 (2019); Pamela Foohey, Life in the Sweatbox, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 119, 242–46 
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debtor and as such make bankruptcy law more relevant and meaningful. Society 
is of course made up of individuals so helping debtors one by one is beneficial 
individually and collectively. 
While poor financial condition causes shame, bankruptcy itself may also 
causes shame.251 Knowing this is the case, we can help in two ways. First, we 
can make it more worthwhile to endure the shame by taking steps to make more 
debts dischargeable and by helping people keep their homes. This is particularly 
justified given that human beings and their communities will benefit without 
hurting lenders much. We can also make bankruptcy less shame-inducing, by 
providing debtors an opportunity to tell their stories, an opportunity to feel that 
they have been heard, and a chance to feel that they are not alone. As Professor 
Pamela Foohey notes in A New Deal for Debtors: Providing Procedural Justice 
in Consumer Bankruptcy, procedural justice helps individuals accept legal 
outcomes.252 In bankruptcy, procedural justice can help people make the most 
of their “fresh start.”253 
All people using the legal system want to be heard, to feel like someone 
cares. Some care more about being heard than about winning.254 When we do a 
listening exercise in law school classes, some students report feeling that they 
are being truly heard to for the first time in their lives. Pamela Foohey provides 
extensive data on how much people in the bankruptcy system long to be heard, 
and also how providing this opportunity can help alleviate shame.255 Providing 
a place to share these stories can help debtors work through their negative 
emotions and feel that they are taking control of their financial lives.256 
Depending on how this opportunity to be heard was structured, it could also 
create an environment in which being forgiven from debt feels more like other 
forms of forgiveness.257 It is possible that the section 341 hearing could be used 
to share these stories, but a less formal setting might be even better.  
I also suggest a return to discharge hearings and I fear that I might be the 
only one in the room to recall that bankruptcy courts used to hold hearings on a 
debtor’s discharge, before signing the discharge order. While these were quite 
pro forma in the past and were done en mass, there is no reason why a court’s 
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order forgiving debts, and a hearing accompanying that event, could not be 
designed to heal. This hearing could lead to feelings of exoneration, of a return 
to wholeness, of a referendum on a person’s return to social standing in 
society.258  
While Professor Foohey suggests an individual hearing in which each debtor 
is questioned by the judge, it may not be necessary to go quite that far. Indeed, 
we could simply return to the days in which there were mass discharge hearings, 
which were known to be somewhat celebratory. Courts could express gratitude 
for our system and for the people who have used it and who have found ways to 
rehabilitate themselves financially. This reconstructed vision of a discharge 
hearing could make the system more humane. Since this costs the system very 
little,259 why not be more humane? What does this really cost us? What does it 
cost us not to do this?  
CONCLUSION 
The changes suggested in this essay are not new, but given the radical 
changes we have seen in the debtor-creditor world in the past two decades, these 
changes are more necessary than ever. These changes could make the 
bankruptcy system more relevant to modern consumers and help make the world 
a better place.  
For centuries, we have enacted laws to reduce or eliminate bias and outright 
discrimination in all segments of society. In the credit world, however, bias and 
discriminatory practices persist despite laws forbidding these practices. Persons 
of credit continue to take out more costly and more harmful mortgages, student 
loans, and other loans than other Americans, even when adjusted for income and 
education. We can modify the bankruptcy system to try to level the playing field 
and ameliorate some of the harm. At the very least, we can work to ensure that 
the bankruptcy system does not create discriminatory results.  
As it stands now, the system is broken for all consumers. Fixing it will help 
all consumers but will help consumers of color more because they carry less 
favorable credit overall. The changes suggested will relieve them of some of this 
low-value credit through discharge or modification of loans.  
 
 258 See id. at 2332.  
 259 This would cost the system very little, particularly if the court no longer had to hear as many student 
loan undue hardship claims. 
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Though we hope the law in general makes the world a better place, it rarely 
does so in the abstract. If we are going to have a personal bankruptcy system, 
we should make it worth people’s efforts. We should not as a society be okay 
with hurting some people without benefiting others. Perhaps we should not be 
okay with hurting people at all.  
 
